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BOUNCING "CHECKBOOK JOURNALISM": A BALANCE
BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS IN HIGH-
PROFILE CRIMINAL CASES
Legislation recently enacted in California attempts to preserve further the right
of the accused to a fair trial and the integrity of judicial proceedings by allowing
criminal prosecution of jurors and witnesses who would enter agreements for or
accept payment, benefit, or other consideration in exchange for information per-
taining to criminal trials. This note analyzes the constitutionality of this legislation
through an evaluation and a balancing of the rights and interests of the accused,
the jurors, the witnesses, the press, and the public implicated in criminal trials.
Despite supporting compelling governmental interests, certain portions of the stat-
utes are too broad, too vague, or not narrowly tailored to meet these governmental
interests. This note then considers proposals to amend the statutes for the purpose
of rectifying constitutional infirmities and withstanding future constitutional chal-
lenges.
* * *
"[F]ree speech and fair trials are two of the most cherished policies of our
civilization, and it would be a trying task to choose between them."'
INTRODUCTION
As television and other media coverage of criminal trials has continued
to expand, so has the public's access and exposure to the criminal trial
process. Although this coverage has given the public greater opportunities to
observe the workings of the American criminal trial process, it has been
neither without its price nor its criticism. Most recently under attack is the
practice of "checkbook journalism" 2 -paying sources for informa-
tion-which may prejudicially effect the minds of jurors3 and undermine
the credibility of witnesses lured by the opportunity to profit from their
testimony.4
' Justice Hugo Black's remark in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of
the United States in Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941).
2 The genesis of the term "checkbook journalism" is unknown, but it has been
widely used in recent years. See, e.g., Richard Cohen, Hitler's Diaries: Checkbook
Journalism Again, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 10, 1983, at A19; Elizabeth Mehren, The
Journalistic Rivalry Over a Juicy Murder Story: Charges and Countercharges
Fly-Everything From Unethical Conduct to Checkbook Journalism, L.A. TIMES, June
26, 1985, View, at 1; Tom Shales, Nixon's Long Look Back: TV Preview: In CBS Inter-
views, He's More Relaxed and Direct, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 1984, at DI; Neil
Singelais, What Were WBZ's Terms?, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 29, 1980, at 23.
See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966).
In addressing the impact on a witness of merely knowing that he or she is being
672 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 4:2
Numerous recent high-profile criminal cases in California and elsewhere
in the United States have given rise to concerns over jury-tampering and the
tainting of witness credibility through checkbook journalism. Before the
infamous double murder trial of former football star O.J. Simpson,' the
credibility of witnesses has been called into question in trials and investiga-
tions surrounding "Long Island Lolita" Amy Fisher,' pop star Michael Jack-
viewed by the media, Justice Tom Clark claimed that "[t]he impact upon a witness of
the knowledge that he is being viewed by a vast audience is simply incalculable. Some
may be ... cocky and given to overstatement." Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 547
(1965). He further intimated that "a natural tendency toward overdramatization" may
actually impede the search for truth. Id.
The fear of these risks exists with regard to witnesses approached by the press and
others who would agree to pay for their testimony. Witnesses can be impeached on the
stand by a showing that monetary or other rewards for favorable testimony have been
offered or accepted. See JON R. WALTZ, INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 136-37
(3d ed. 1991). Such impeachment is based on the ability to prove a witness's bias,
which is always relevant to credibility and subject to thorough examination on the
stand. Id.; see also CAL. EVID. CODE § 780(f) (West 1995) (evidentiary rule allowing
courts to determine witness credibility on any matter tending to prove or disprove the
truthfulness of testimony such as bias, interest, or motive). While the Federal Rules of
Evidence do not specifically mention bias, they have been observed as "clearly
contemplat[ing] the use of [bias, prejudice, or corruption as] grounds of impeachment."
United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 50 (1984) (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 40, at 85 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984)).
With the knowledge that money is involved and that more sensational testimony
would likely be worth more money, witnesses who make agreements to receive pay-
ment may display bias or be perceived as biased by judges and juries, thus undermining
the efficacy and legitimacy of their testimony.
' Simpson, a former running back for the Buffalo Bills and San Francisco 49ers
football teams, was on trial in Los Angeles, California, for the double homicide of his
former wife, Nicole Brown Simpson, and her friend, Ronald Goldman. Howard Witt,
Jury Acquits O.J. Simpson: Not Guilty; The Verdict; Judge Ito Orders Ex-Football Star
Freed From Jail, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 3, 1995, at 1. Simpson was acquitted of the charges
on October 3, 1995. Id. The trial was so highly publicized that it was ubiquitously
billed as the "trial of the century," a title previously reserved for the trial of Bruno
Richard Hauptmann, the man convicted and executed for kidnapping the baby of
Charles and Anne Morrow Lindbergh. Paula Fass, Lindbergh: Real Trial of the Century,
L.A. TIMEs, Jan. '29, 1995, at Ml. The trial of Hauptmann attracted an estimated 700
reporters and photographers, 40 newswires, television (which was in its infancy at that
point), and some 75,000 to 100,000 onlookers. Id.
6 Fisher was convicted of shooting the wife of Joey Buttafuoco, the man later in-
dicted and convicted for the statutory rape of Fisher. Pete Dexter, Scratch a 'Victim'
and You May Find a Not-So-Good Kid, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 30, 1993, at I ID.
Prior to the conviction of Buttafuoco for statutory rape, Fisher had been videotaped
telling a friend that she wanted to get enough money from selling her story to buy a
Corvette. Id. at lID. Fisher's former boyfriend was reportedly paid between $50,000
and $100,000 for the videotape. Craig Gordon & Sylvia Adcock, Amy and Joey: Crime
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son,7 Olympic figure skater Tonya Harding,' and William Kennedy Smith.9
In each of these cases or controversies, the credibility of witnesses was
tarnished, and, in some cases, believed to be a strong factor in determining
the outcome of the trial or untried controversy.' ° The credibility of certain
witnesses, real or potential, was scrutinized at various phases of the
Simpson trial because they sold their stories to the media. Examples abound:
two men who claim to have sold Simpson a knife six weeks before the
murders received $12,500 from the National Enquirer;" a woman who
claims to have seen Simpson near the scene of the crime on the night of the
murders sold her story to Hard Copy, a television tabloid, and the Star, a
Pays in Big Way; Their Saga Breeds Money for Many, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Nov. 22, 1993,
at 5.
' Jackson had been accused of molesting a juvenile, but the case was settled out of
court. Henry Weinstein, Free-Spending Tabloid Media Causing Judicial Concerns, L.A.
TIMES, July 2, 1994, at Al, A2. Jackson's attorney, Johnnie Cochran, who was also one
of the defense attorneys in O.J. Simpson's murder trial, claimed that two witnesses
against Jackson sold stories to tabloid TV shows that contradicted and were more sensa-
tional than what they said in sworn depositions for the civil suit. Id. at A2.
8 In 1994, U.S. Olympic figure skater Nancy Kerrigan was beaten in the knee by
two assailants associated with competing Olympic skater Tonya Harding. During the
resolution of the case, prominent figures for the defense allegedly received huge pay-
offs for interviews with tabloid television programs. The two accused assailants report-
edly received $100,000 toward their legal defense fund by selling their version of the
events to Hard Copy, a tabloid television show. Robin Clark, Tabloids Are Paying, But
at a Cost: Journalism by Checkbook Is a Big Problem in High-Profile Cases, PHILA.
INQUIRER, July 3, 1994, at Cl. Likewise, Harding's ex-husband, Jeff Gillooly, reported-
ly received $250,000 for his exclusive story from A Current Affair, another tabloid tele-
vision show; Harding herself allegedly sold her story to the television tabloid Inside
Edition for more than $500,000. Id.
' Defense attorneys in the 1991 William Kennedy Smith rape trial were successful
in undermining the testimony of a key prosecution witness, Anne Mercer, after she
acknowledged having been paid $40,000 to appear on A Current Affair. Howard Kurtz,
Fees for Sleaze: When You Buy News, Do You Get Taken?, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1994,
at Cl.
'0 Mark Schnapp, a defense attorney in William Kennedy Smith's rape trial, claimed
the $40,000 sale of information by the key prosecution witness was a substantial factor
in obtaining an acquittal. Clark, supra note 8, at Cl. According to Schnapp, "[w]hen
that came out [during the trial], there was an audible gasp from the jury." Id. Likewise,
prosecutors in the statutory rape case against Joey Buttafuoco decided that Amy
Fisher's videotaped comments regarding her desire for money in exchange for her story
destroyed her credibility as a witness; the prosecutors believed this made impossible the
prosecution of Buttafuoco for statutory rape. See Gordon & Adcock, supra note 6, at 5.
" Jim Newton & Andrea Ford, Simpson Bought a Knife Weeks Before Slayings,
Court Is Told, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 1994, at Al. Allen Wattenberg, the store owner, and
Jose Camacho, the sales clerk, claimed that Simpson bought a knife from their store
and had them sharpen it. Id. On cross-examination by defense attorney Robert Shapiro,
Camacho admitted to having sold the story to the highest bidder. Id.
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newspaper tabloid, for an estimated $7600;12 and a friend of Simpson has
been offered "'up to $1 million for his story.""..3 These examples are indi-
cia of the spreading practice of checkbook journalism witnessed in this
country since the Watergate scandal in the 1970s.14 The spread of this
practice has led to yet another confrontation between, on the one hand,
sensationalism engendered by free speech, the free press, and a free market,
and on the other hand, the right of criminal defendants to a fair trial.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that when a "case is a
'sensational' one[,] tensions develop between the right of the accused to trial
by an impartial jury and the rights guaranteed others by the First Amend-
ment.""5 Although freedom of speech and the press are important, the
Court has found a fair trial to be the most fundamental of all freedoms and
that the atmosphere essential to the preservation of fair trials must be main-
tained at all costs.
16
The means by which the American judicial system attempts to maintain
this proper atmosphere include the use of rules, contempt proceedings, and
the reversal of convictions obtained under unfair conditions. 7 The trial
judge bears the duty of ensuring that defendants receive a fair trial by con-
trolling the behavior of the media and trial participants both in and out of
the courtroom. Nevertheless, besides the trial judge bearing the responsi-
bility of managing the media and others, the Supreme Court has also point-
12 Jill Shively, a neighbor of Nicole Brown Simpson, claimed to have seen Simpson
speeding through the streets in his white Ford Bronco near his ex-wife's residence
around the time of the murders. Clark, supra note 8, at Cl. The Los Angeles District
Attorney's office decided not to call Shively as a witness for fear that her receipt of
payment would make her testimony suspect. See Jessica Seigel, Testimony Bought,
Sold-and Ruined: As in Other Trials, Checkbook Journalism in the Simpson Case
Makes It Hard to Protect the 'Integrity' of Witnesses, CHI. TRIB., June 29, 1994, at 1.
'" Weinstein, supra note 7, at Al (quoting Donald M. Re, the attorney of Simpson's
friend Al Cowlings). Cowlings declined that offer along with other offers, according to
Re. Id.
" In fact, mainstream media joined the fray of checkbook journalism back in the
1970s following the Watergate scandal. CBS paid former Nixon aide H.R. Haldemann
$25,000 in exchange for an interview on 60 Minutes and paid Watergate burglar G.
Gordon Liddy $15,000. Kurtz, supra note 9, at Cl. David Frost later set new heights
for checkbook journalism when he paid former President Richard Nixon $600,000 for a
series of interviews. Id.
'5 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 551 (1976).
6 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
17 Id.
" This point was emphasized by the Supreme Court in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333 (1966). In Sheppard, the Court held that a failure of a state trial judge in a
murder prosecution to protect the defendant from inherently prejudicial publicity and
disruptive influences in the courtroom denied the defendant a fair trial consistent with
due process. Id.
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ed to the potential valuable contributions of legislators in
"promulgat[ing] ... regulation[s] with respect to dissemination of informa-
tion about .. case[s]."' 9 In Sheppard v. Maxwell," the Court made a
compelling argument in favor of the legislature enacting stricter laws to
ensure the right of defendants to a fair trial, emphasizing that proper mea-
sures must be taken as early as possible to prevent both interference and the
seeking of remedial justice in appellate courts. E'
On September 26, 1994, the California legislature enacted provisions of
its penal and civil codes under which jurors and witnesses serving in crimi-
nal trials in California would be subjected to new constraints in publicizing
their stories. The legislation, proposed by California Assembly Speaker
Willie Brown22 and California State Senator Quentin Kopp,23 was de-
signed to prohibit jurors,24 anyone acting on a juror's behalf,25 and poten-
tial or actual witnesses 26 from providing information in relation to any
19 Id. at 362.
20 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
21 Id. at 362. Justice Clark, delivering the opinion of the Court, confronted the con-
cers of the Court over modem communication technology, the prejudicial effect it may
have on the minds of jurors, and the inadequacy of reversals of convictions as a remedy
to the injustice of unfair trials:
Given the pervasiveness of modem communications and the difficulty of effacing
prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts must take strong
measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the accused....
[R]eversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial measures that will
prevent the prejudice at its inception. The courts must take such steps by rule and
regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside interferences.
Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff[,] nor
enforcement officers coming under the jurisdiction of the court should be permit-
ted to frustrate its function. Collaboration between counsel and the press as to
information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to regula-
tion, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures.
Id. at 362-63.
22 CA. A.B. 501, 1993-94 Reg. Sess., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 132.5, 1122.5 (West
Supp. 1995).
23 CA. S.B. 1999, 1993-94 Reg. Sess., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 116.5, 132.5, 1122
(West Supp. 1995), CAL. CIV. CODE § 1669.7 (West Supp. 1995).
24 CAL. PENAL CODE § 116.5(a)(3).
25 See id. § 116.5(a)(l)-(2). Section 116.5 of the Penal Code also makes a person
guilty of jury tampering who "[c]onfers, or offers or agrees to confer, any payment or
benefit upon a juror or upon a third person who is acting on behalf of a juror in con-
sideration for the juror or third person supplying information in relation to an action or
proceeding." Id. § 116.5(a)(1).
26 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 132.5(a) (Senate), 132.5(b)-(c) (Assembly). Note that both
California Senate Bill 1999 and California Assembly Bill 501, which created § 132.5 of
the California Penal Code, were passed by the California legislature, and signed into
law by the Governor on the same date. The two bills were never reconciled; according-
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criminal action or proceeding in return for payment.27 The new laws, how-
ever, have already come under constitutional attack. In May 1995, California
Penal Code Section 116.5, which is aimed at jurors, was successfully en-
joined from specific application against plaintiffs Michael Knox, one of the
original twelve jurors empaneled but later excused from the O.J. Simpson
murder trial in Los Angeles, and Dove Audio, Inc., a California corporation
which sought to enter into an agreement with Knox to publish a book con-
cerning his experiences and impressions as a juror in the Simpson case."
Three months later, section 132.5 of the California Penal Code and section
1669.7 of the California Civil Code, both of which targeted witnesses who
sell information, were permanently enjoined from enforcement following a
challenge by the California First Amendment Coalition (CFAC).29
The opinions issued in these cases by the United States district courts in
Los Angeles and San Francisco respectively only partially analyzed the
constitutional dimensions raised by these statutes. This Note more fully
addresses the constitutionality of the new California Penal Code sections by
analyzing the statutes with respect to the various rights and interests impli-
cated in such legislation. Part I describes in greater detail the newly enacted
sections to the California Penal Code, and Part II examines the sections'
constitutionality. Specifically, Part II.A discusses the rights of criminal de-
fendants under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
ly, the current California Penal Code contains two §§ 132.5 that exist side by side de-
spite significant differences in terms of penalties for violations. Under California law,
when two or more statutes or amendments are enacted at the same session concerning
the same section, the statute enacted last is conclusively presumed to prevail over those
enacted earlier. CAL. Gov. CODE ANN. § 9605 (West 1992). This is known as the
"highest chapter number test." 58 CAL. JuR. 3D (Statutes) § 44 (1980). Under this test,
those provisions of the earlier-enacted statute (in this case, CAL. PENAL CODE § 132.5
(Senate)) that are consistent with the later-enacted statute (in this case, CAL. PENAL
CODE § 132.5(b)-(c) (Assembly)) remain in effect, and those which are inconsistent are
superseded by the later enacted provisions.
In this Note, the Senate- and Assembly-sponsored code sections will be distin-
guished by a parenthetical after the code section. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 132.5 (Sen-
ate); id. § 132.5 (Assembly).
27 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 116.5, 132.5.
21 See Dove Audio, Inc. v. Lungren, No. CV 95-2570 RG (JRX), 1995 WL 432631,
at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 14, 1995).
29 California First Amendment Coalition v. Lungren, No. C 95-0440-FMS, 1995 WL
482066 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 1995). CFAC is a non-profit organization composed of
seven media professional associations, over two hundred individual news organizations,
and other members who are dedicated to protecting the right to free expression of
California's journalists and citizens. Id. at *1; see also Lynn Ludlow, A Curse Worse
Than the Disease: The First Amendment Coalition Rightly Asks the Court to Toss Out
the State's New Checkbook Journalism Law as Unconstitutional, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb.
21, 1995, at A16.
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while Part II.B addresses the First Amendment rights, responsibilities, and
interests of the public, and the media in the context of criminal trials. Part
II.C addresses the First Amendment rights, responsibilities, and interests of
jurors and witnesses in the context of criminal trials and argues that the
newly enacted California statutes are constitutionally valid in their purpose
but not in scope in balancing these competing rights. Suggestions are of-
fered regarding the scope of limitations placed on criminal trial jurors and
witnesses in order to rehabilitate the statutes and preserve them against
future constitutional scrutiny.
I. LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OVER JUROR AND WITNESS CONTACT WITH THE
MEDIA
The newly adopted California Penal and Civil Code sections were de-
signed to preserve further the right of the accused to a fair trial, the right of
the people to due process of law, and the integrity of judicial proceed-
ings.30 The objectives stated to reach these goals include preventing the
loss of credible evidence in criminal trials, the erosion of reliability in ver-
dicts, and the appearance of injustice that is destructive to public confidence.31
30 CAL. PENAL CODE § 132.5(a) (Senate). The intent of the legislation was men-
tioned only in this version of § 132.5, which concerns witnesses supplying information,
and is not actually mentioned in § 116.5, which concerns information supplied by jurors
or their "agents." Id. §§ 116.5, 132.5(a) (Senate). Specifically, § 132.5(a) (Senate)
states:
The Legislature supports and affirms the constitutional right of every person to
communicate on any subject. This section is intended to preserve the right of
every accused person to a fair trial, the right of the people to due process of law,
and the integrity of judicial proceedings. This section is not intended to prevent
any person from disseminating any information or opinion.
The Legislature hereby finds and declares that the disclosure for valuable consid-
eration of information relating to crimes by prospective witnesses can cause the
loss of credible evidence in criminal trials and threatens to erode the reliability of
verdicts.
The Legislature further finds and declares that the disclosure for valuable consid-
eration of information relating to crimes by prospective witnesses creates an ap-
pearance of injustice that is destructive of public confidence.
Id. § 132.5(a) (Senate). Having signed the two new bills into law, Governor Wilson was
quoted as saying that the new laws would "'ensure that witnesses and jurors are a force
for justice, not fodder for tabloids, and that attorneys will represent their client, not lead
a media circus."' Carl Ingram, Legislation Inspired by Simpson Case Signed, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 1994, at A21.
" CAL. PENAL CODE § 132.5(a) (Senate). California Senator Quentin Kopp and
Assembly Speaker Willie Brown, whose respective senate and assembly bills, see supra
notes 22-23, collectively became § 132.5 of the Penal Code, were reported as saying
that the sale of information contaminates the right to a fair trial by providing the incen-
tive to lie. Ingram, supra note 30, at A21-A22. They further stated that a compensated
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In order to achieve these goals, the California legislature has enacted
legislation with two primary objectives. First, the legislature has targeted
jury tampering by making unlawful any agreements for the conferral of
payment or other consideration to jurors for information relating to criminal
proceedings.3 2 Second, the legislature has targeted the tainting of potential-
ly valuable evidence provided by witnesses in criminal cases by making
unlawful any agreements for the conferral of payment or other consideration
to witnesses in criminal trials for information pertaining to either their par-
ticular knowledge of facts or their witnessing of events or occurrences.33
A. Jury Tampering
Jurors are expected to serve as impartial arbiters of justice in deciding
whether to convict or acquit criminal defendants.34 As a means of ensuring
that jurors are able to evaluate objectively evidence brought to trial and to
be free from external influence, the California legislature has enacted provi-
sions to prohibit jury tampering. Prior to the enactment of Section 116.5 of
the California Penal Code, California's statutory control over juror impartial-
ity had been found exclusively in sections 95 and 1121." Section 95 pun-
witness may lose credibility in the eyes of a jury, even if he or she tells the truth. Id.;
see also WALTZ, supra note 4, at 132-33. According to Brown, the legislation is aimed
"at those persons who are motivated by the lure of money to participate [in the event],
sometimes accurately, sometimes not so accurately." Stephen Green & Jon Matthews,
Denying Witnesses a Quick Profit: Bills Would Outlaw Fast Sales of Stories, SACRA-
MENTO BEE, Aug. 17, 1994, at Al.
32 CAL. PENAL CODE § 116.5(a).
3 Under CAL. PENAL CODE § 132.5(b)-(c) (Assembly), unlawful witness contact is
defined as follows:
(b) A person who is a witness to an event or occurrence that he or she knows is a
crime or who has personal knowledge of facts that he or she knows or reasonably
should know may require that person to be called as a witness in a criminal pros-
ecution shall not accept or receive, directly or indirectly, any money or its equiva-
lent in consideration for providing information obtained as result of witnessing the
event or occurrence or having personal knowledge of the facts.
(c) Any person who is a witness to an event or occurrence that he or she reason-
ably should know is a crime shall not accept or receive, directly or indirectly, any
money or its equivalent in consideration for providing information obtained as a
result of his or her witnessing the event or occurrence.
Id. § 132.5(b)-(c) (Assembly).
" It is the responsibility of the legislatures and the courts to ensure that jurors are
aware of the power that rests in their hands in serving the interests of justice. See, e.g.,
ALBERT S. OSBORN, THE MIND OF THE JUROR 1 (1937) ("Those responsible for the
procedure and the surroundings are at fault if this juror is not in every way possible led
keenly to realize that for the time being the interests of justice are in his control.").
35 CAL. PENAL CODE § 95 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); id. § 1121 (West 1985).
678 [Vol. 4:2
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ishes any individual who corruptly attempts to influence a juror.36 Section
1121 takes a broader aim of preventing jurors from discussing any informa-
tion concerning their trial while in court custody or during periods of sepa-
ration from the rest of the jury and court.37
The definition of jury tampering is significantly broadened under Cali-
fornia Penal Code Section 116.5(a), which states:
A person is guilty of tampering with a jury when, prior to,
or within 90 days of, discharge of the jury in a criminal
proceeding, he or she does any of the following:
(1) Confers, or offers or agrees to confer, any payment or
benefit upon a juror or upon a third person who is acting on
behalf of a juror in consideration for the juror or third person
supplying information in relation to an action or proceeding.
(2) Acting on behalf of a juror, accepts or agrees to accept
any payment or benefit for himself or herself or for the juror
in consideration for supplying any information in relation to
an action or proceeding.
(3) Acting on behalf of himself or herself, agrees to accept,
directly or indirectly, any payment or benefit in consideration
for supplying any information in relation to an action or pro-
ceeding. 8
The Penal Code makes such jury tampering a misdemeanor,39 and a
person convicted of violating section 116.5 must forfeit the compensation.'
Although violations under the code apply at any time prior to or within
ninety days of the jury's discharge,4 compensation paid to a juror within
ninety days of discharge and not exceeding fifty dollars does not constitute
a criminal violation.42
As an additional tool to reinforce the effectiveness of this jury tampering
statute, both California Senate Bill 1999 and California Assembly Bill 501
provided new sections to the Penal Code: sections 11224" and 1122.5."
These sections provide instructions and guidance to judges to facilitate their
36 Id. § 95.
31 Id. § 1121.
38 Id. § 116.5(a) (West Supp. 1995).
39 Id. § 116.5(b).
o Id. § 116.5(d). The forfeited compensation is then deposited in the Victim Restitu-
tion Fund. Id.
,' Id. § 116.5(a).
42 Id. § 116.5(c).
43 Id. § 1122 (West Supp. 1995).
" Id. § 1122.5 (West Supp. 1995).
1995] 679
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control over juror conduct and to promote justice and the appearance there-
of.4'
Section 1122(a) explicitly requires judges, "[a]fter the jury has been
sworn and before the people's opening address," to
instruct the jury generally concerning its basic functions,
duties, and conduct... includ[ing], among other matters,
admonitions that the jurors shall not ... prior to, and within
90 days of, discharge .... request, accept, agree to accept, or
discuss with any person receiving or accepting, any payment
or benefit in consideration for supplying any information
concerning the trial; and that they shall promptly report to
the court any incident within their knowledge involving an
attempt by any person to improperly influence any member
of the jury.4
Section 1122.5 of the Penal Code also authorizes courts, at their discretion,
to admonish juries at each adjournment of the court and before submission
of the case to the jury that "on pain of contempt of court, no juror shall,
prior to discharge, accept, agree to accept, or benefit, directly or indirectly,
from any payment or other consideration for supplying any information con-
cerning the trial."'47
B. Witnesses
Witness testimony is often subjected to harsh scrutiny in court during
direct and cross-examination. The validity and veracity of a witness's testi-
mony may be challenged and impeached by questioning the witness herself
or other witnesses concerning her character for truthfulness,' any prior
criminal convictions,49 or any bias, motive, or interest. 0 With the knowl-
edge that money is involved and that more sensational testimony would
likely be worth more money, witnesses who make agreements to receive
payment for information pertaining to a trial may be perceived as biased by
judges and juries," thus undermining the very efficacy and legitimacy of
their testimony. Although prosecution and defense attorneys have the ability
4s See id. § 1122.5(b).
46 Id. § 1122.
Id. § 1122.5(a).
-See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 608(a); CAL. EVID. CODE § 780 (West 1995).
'9 See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 609; CAL. EVID. CODE § 788 (West 1995).
o See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
s' See WALTz, supra note 4, at 136-37.
[Vol. 4:2
BOUNCING "CHECKBOOK JOURNALISM"
to impeach witnesses who show such bias,52 the effect of the impeachment
could be to discredit the testimony of the witness regardless of whether the
testimony given was true. Taken to an extreme, the possibility exists that a
witness could testify truthfully and still be impeached, resulting in the ac-
quittal of a genuinely guilty defendant or the conviction of a genuinely
innocent defendant. In such incidents, impeachment as a tool of direct exam-
ination and cross-examination would not serve the interests of justice.
The ability to impeach witnesses for such agreements should be viewed
as a remedy whose effect is palliative and potentially detrimental to the
interests of justice. Just as the Court in Sheppard found that "reversals [of
convictions] are but palliatives" and that "the cure lies in those remedial
measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception,"53 a mechanism
should exist to discourage the ultimate injustice of the appearance of bias
before it has a chance to occur. The California legislature has done just that
by enacting section 132.5.
The California Senate and the California Assembly drafted separate
versions of section 132.5."4 Both houses of the California legislature passed
both versions by a majority vote of each house," and the Governor signed
both versions into law on September 26, 1994.56 Both versions of Califor-
nia Penal Code Section 132.5 address the same issue of witnesses accepting
or receiving payment or benefit in return for information obtained as a result
of witnessing events or holding personal knowledge in criminal trials.57
The Assembly-sponsored section 132.5 explicitly outlines the purpose of the
statute: to discourage "the disclosure for valuable consideration of informa-
tion relating to crimes by prospective witnesses [that] can cause the loss of
credible evidence in criminal trials and [that] threatens to erode the reliabili-
ty of verdicts,"58 thus possibly creating "an appearance of injustice that is
destructive of public confidence."59
Violations of section 132.5 are defined in terms of subjective and objec-
tive standards.' The following may be subject to prosecution under Section
132.5: A person who witnesses an event or occurrence that he or she knows,
or reasonably should know, is a crime; or a person who has personal knowl-
edge of facts that he knows, or reasonably should know, may require that
52 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
4 See supra note 26.
As required under the CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
56 For an explanation of how to resolve which portions of the partially conflicting
legislation are valid law, see supra note 26.
17 See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 132.5 (Senate), 132.5 (Assembly) (West Supp. 1995).
5 Id. § 132.5(a) (Assembly).
59 Id.
60 See supra note 33.
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person to be called as a witness.6" A violation occurs if that person accepts
or receives, directly or indirectly, any payment or benefit in consideration
for providing information obtained as a result of witnessing the event or
occurrence or having personal knowledge of the facts.62 Note that in con-
trast to the jury-tampering provision in Penal Code Section 116.5, under
which both the offering and accepting parties may be guilty of a violation,
Penal Code Section 132.5 holds only the witness involved liable for viola-
tions."
A violation of Section 132.5 constitutes a misdemeanor punishable by a
maximum of six months in a county jail, imposition of a fine, or both.64
The Senate-sponsored version of section 132.5 states that "any compensation
received in violation of this section shall be forfeited by the defendant and
deposited in the Victim Restitution Fund.' '6' The Assembly-sponsored ver-
sion of section 132.5 allows two possible financial penalties to be imposed.
First, a fine may be imposed equal to three times the amount requested,
accepted, or received. 6  This allows a fine to be imposed even if payment
was merely requested, regardless of whether payment was actually re-
ceived.67 Second, a person who violates section 132.5 may be held civilly
liable.68 The California Senate and Assembly included identical exceptions
62 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 132.5(a) (Senate), 132.5(b)-(c) (Assembly).
62 Id. §§ 132.5(a) (Senate), 132.5(b)-(c) (Assembly). While the Senate-adopted ver-
sion defines violations in terms of acceptance or receipt of payment or benefit, id.
§ 132.5(a) (Senate), the Assembly-adopted version defines violations in terms of accep-
tance or receipt of money or its equivalent in consideration, id. § 132.5(b)-(c) (Assem-
bly).
63 Compare id. § 116.5(a)(l)-(3) (West Supp. 1995) with id. § 132.5(a) (Senate) and
id. § 132.5(b)-(c) (Assembly).
64 CAL. PENAL CODE § 132.5(b) (Senate).
65 Id. § 132.5(c) (Senate). This is consistent with the fine imposed on those persons
who violate § 116.5 by jury tampering, which was also enacted based upon CA. S.B.
No. 1999. See id. § 116.5(d).
Passage of California Senate Bill No. 1999 also enacted the new CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1669.7, which voids contracts for payment of money or other consideration in viola-
tion of CAL. PENAL CODE § 132.5 as contrary to public policy. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1669.7 (West Supp. 1995). Section 1669.7 further states that "[t]he Attorney General
or the district attorney of the county in which a violation of Section 132.5 of the Penal
Code occurs may bring a civil action, or intervene in any civil action, to enjoin the
enforcement of a contract that violates that section." Id.
' CAL. PENAL CODE § 132.5(e) (Assembly).
67 See id. The Senate-sponsored § 132.5, which was superseded by the Assembly-
sponsored version, would have imposed a financial penalty only on compensation re-
ceived. See id. § 132.5(a) (Senate).
Id. § 132.5(d) (Assembly). Specifically, the statute provides:
The Attorney General or the district attorney of the county in which an alleged
violation of subdivision (c) occurs may institute a civil proceeding. Where a final
judgment is rendered in the civil proceeding, the defendant shall be punished for
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for acceptable circumstances of payment to witnesses. 9 Exceptions exist
for the following circumstances:
(1) Lawful compensation paid to expert witnesses, investiga-
tors, employees, or agents by a prosecutor, law enforcement
agency, or an attorney employed to represent a person in a
criminal matter.
(2) Lawful compensation provided to an informant by a
prosecutor or law enforcement agency.
(3) Compensation paid to a publisher, editor, reporter, writer,
or other person connected with or employed by a newspaper,
magazine, or other publication or a television or radio news
reporter or other person connected with a television or radio
station, for disclosing information obtained in the ordinary
course of business.
(4) Statutorily authorized rewards offered by governmental
agencies for information leading to the arrest and conviction
of specified offenders.7"
These exceptions can be justified as being made for those individuals who
are customarily or otherwise statutorily allowed to receive payment for their
testimony in accordance with public policy rationales underlying evidentiary
and procedural rules in trials.
For example, the Federal Rules of Evidence and the California Evidence
Code countenance the use of expert witnesses in trials.71 Experts allowed
by the rules are generally those whose specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact understanding the evidence presented or to determine a fact in
issue.72 These experts are traditionally compensated for their time spent
studying the case or presenting testimony.73 Despite the fact that public
the violation of subdivision (c) by a fine equal to 150 percent of the amount re-
ceived or contracted for by the person.
Id. This raises the issue of whether double jeopardy should preclude the state from
conducting both civil and criminal proceedings against violators of § 132.5. This issue
is beyond the scope of this Note and will not be discussed.
69 See id. §§ 132.5(e)(1)-(4) (Senate), § 132.5(g)(1)-(4) (Assembly).
70 See sources cited supra note 69.
71 See FED. R. EvID. §§ 702-706; CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 720-723, 730-733 (West
1995).
72 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. § 702; CAL. EVID. CODE § 720(a).
" In federal civil cases, parties who retain, regularly employ, or specially employ
expert witnesses are required to disclose the identities of those experts and any
compensation to be paid to the experts for their testimony or study. FED. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(2)(A)-(B). Under certain conditions, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure even re-
quire that experts be compensated by adverse parties for their time in responding to dis-
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policy may favor paying experts for their testimony, their compensation in
exchange for their services is still a proper subject of inquiry in determining
their credibility.74
Compensation considered under exceptions (2) and (4) above need not
take the form of monetary payment. For example, in order to obtain a con-
viction of one defendant, prosecutors may find it necessary to call witnesses
who also happen to be codefendants in the same trial or who have charges
pending in other cases. To obtain such testimony, prosecutors may exercise
their discretion to reduce charges, reduce requested sentences, or offer pros-
ecutorial immunity. While the weight of public policy may favor such of-
fers, these offers may nonetheless be the subject of a proper inquiry during
examination of the witnesses to show their bias or self-interest in the out-
come of the trial.75
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Although the purposes and objectives of newly enacted California Penal
Code Sections 116.5, 132.5, 1122, and 1122.5 and California Civil Code
Section 1669.7 are admirable, they have been subject to debate over their
constitutionality both during the legislative process and since their passage.
Specifically, their constitutionality has been questioned with respect to the
rights of defendants under the Sixth Amendment as balanced against the
covery requests. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4)(C).
In some instances, courts will appoint and require the compensation of experts
without the motion of trial participants. When courts determine that expert evidence is
or may be required, courts may in certain instances appoint, sua sponte, experts to in-
vestigate, render reports to the courts, and testify. See, e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE § 730.
Furthermore, in California criminal and juvenile actions, courts may determine that
compensation for the services of experts is justified and assign the costs of paying for
those services to the jurisdiction in which the action is proceeding. See, e.g., id.
§ 731(a).
71 California evidentiary rules specifically state that "the compensation and expenses
paid or to be paid to an expert witness by the party calling him is a proper subject of
inquiry by any adverse party as relevant to the credibility of the witness and the weight
of his testimony." CAL. EVID. CODE § 722(b).
71 See, e.g., Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414 (1953) (admitting evidence that
witness was promised a reduced sentence via plea bargaining); United States v.
Musgrave, 483 F.2d 327 (5th Cir.) (finding that witness's prior status as a co-inductee
suggested personal interest in the litigation), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1023, and cert. de-
nied sub nom. Womack v. United States, 414 U.S. 1025 (1973); Wheeler v. United
States, 351 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1965) (admitting evidence of potential bias against the
defendant where witness was a paid informant); People v. Dillwood, 39 P. 439 (Cal.
1895) (admitting evidence that other charges were pending against the witness); People
v. Gibbs, 255 Cal. App. 2d 739 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (admitting evidence where an in-
formant hoped to escape prosecution).
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rights of the press, public, jurors, and witnesses under the First Amendment.
In May 1995, the Federal District Court in Los Angeles permanently en-
joined enforcement of section 116.5 against dismissed Simpson juror Mi-
chael Knox and his publisher Dove Audio.76 Nevertheless, the specificity of
the injunction does not preclude future prosecution of jurors who violate
section 116.5 while still serving on jury duty." In August 1995, the CFAC
waged a successful constitutional challenge by gaining a permanent injunc-
tion against any future enforcement of Penal Code section 132.5 and Civil
Code Section 1669.7.78 Thus, the new statutes have taken their place in the
long history of unsuccessful attempts to balance Sixth Amendment rights
against First Amendment rights under substantive due process analysis. The
early fate of the statutes should not impugn the validity of attempting to
control participants in criminal trials. The opinions of the two courts barely
addressed the challenges laid by the United States Supreme Court for trial
courts and local legislatures to control trial participants so as to preserve the
rights of the criminally accused to a fair trial.79
The prospective success of either the CFAC prevailing on appeal or of
other future challenges to California's or other states' similar penal code
sections will depend primarily on the identity of the party raising the chal-
lenge. The press, public, jurors, and witnesses each have varying rights and
interests affected by the enactment of sections 116.5 and 132.5. The degree
to which each is affected varies greatly. The following sections analyze the
rights of the press, public, jurors, and witnesses, in addition to the effect on
those parties' rights when balanced against the rights of a criminal defendant
to a fair trial.
A. A Defendant's Right to a Fair Trial
Criminal defendants in the United States are guaranteed the right to a
public trial by an impartial jury and the right to confront the witnesses testi-
fying against them.8° These requirements are enforced so strongly that in
76 Dove Audio, Inc. v. Lungren, No. CV 95-2570 RG (JRX), 1995 WL 432631
(C.D. Cal. June 14, 1995).
" The defendants only were permanently restrained and enjoined from enforcing
§ 116.5 against the plaintiffs. Id. at *6. The court did not reach the issue of whether
§ 116.5 was otherwise unconstitutional as applied to other jurors. See id.
78 California First Amendment Coalition v. Lungren, No. C 95-0440-FMS, 1995 WL
482066 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 1995); Jim Doyle, Ban on Pay to News Sources Is At-
tacked: 1st Amendment Group Calls It Unconstitutional, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 8, 1995, at
A4.
79 See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
SO "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him ...... U.S.
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certain instances defendants who have experienced a deprivation of this right
have had their convictions reversed on appeal.81
Although the new California statutes implicate the constitutional rights
of the press, public, jurors, and witnesses, the statutes' status seems clear
when balanced against the Sixth Amendment rights of criminal defendants.
In Estes v. Texas,8" the United States Supreme Court stated that it has "al-
ways held that the atmosphere essential to the preservation of a fair tri-
al-the most fundamental of all freedoms-must be maintained at all
costs."83 In an even broader statement concerning the criminal defendant's
right to a fair trial, Justice Black stated:
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due
process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias
in the trial of cases. But our system of law has always en-
deavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness....
[T]o perform its high function in the best way "justice must
satisfy the appearance of justice."84
The right to a fair trial is also considered essential to the preservation of
all other rights, as a necessary means of safeguarding personal liberties
against government oppression. In In re Oliver,85 the Court enunciated the
CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment right to a public trial by an impartial jury
has been made applicable to the States by way of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
"1 See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 354-57, 363 (1966) (reversing
denial of habeas petition where defendant's right to a fair trial was severely compro-
mised by media circus surrounding his trial); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965)
(reversing and remanding conviction where defendant's Fourteenth Amendment due
process right was violated by the televising of his notorious, publicized, and highly
sensational criminal trial); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 727 (1963) (reversing
conviction and ordering a new trial following a denial of change of venue from a ju-
risdiction where the defendant's confession was repeatedly televised and from which the
jurors were drawn); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 725-28 (1961) (reversing conviction
and ordering a new trial where there was pervasive and hostile news coverage of a
defendant's confession to several murders and burglaries); Marshall v. United States,
360 U.S. 310, 311-12 (1959) (setting aside federal conviction where jurors had been
exposed via news accounts to information not available at trial).
82 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
83 Id. at 540; see also In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 609 (2d Cir. 1988)
("When the exercise of free press rights actually tramples upon Sixth Amendment
rights, the former must nonetheless yield to the latter."), cert. denied sub nom. Dow
Jones & Co. v. Simon, 488 U.S. 946 (1988).
84 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348
U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
85 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (holding that the secrecy of a criminal contempt trial violat-
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clear role of a public trial as a guarantee to the defendant of a fair trial.8"
The Court stated that the right to a public trial "has always been recognized
as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of
persecution" and that "the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint
on possible abuse of judicial power."87
B. Freedom of the Press: The Rights, Interests, and Roles of the Press and
Public in Criminal Trials
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of a public trial to the ac-
cused in a criminal process.88 The requirement of a "public trial" serves an
essential role in providing the accused with guarantees against unfairness or
unjust condemnation.89 According to the Court in Oliver, "[t]he knowledge
that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum
of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial pow-
er.,,19
0
As a corollary to the accused's right to a public trial, the Court has also
recognized the public's right to information pertaining to criminal trials.
This is apparent from the Court's statements that "'the public ... has a
right to every man's evidence,' 91 except for evidence protected by a con-
stitutional, common-law, or statutory privilege, and that "what transpires in
the court room is public property."92 In its capacity of informing the public
through dissemination of information, the free press plays a critical role. It
should be remembered, however, that the interest of the public in informa-
tion pertaining to criminal trials arises from the accused's personal right to
a public trial guaranteed in the Sixth Amendment, not from a right held by
the public.93 This guarantee protects "'all persons accused of crime-the
ed the accused's Fourteenth Amendment right to a public trial).
86 Id.
7 Id. at 270.
8 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a ... public
trial ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
9 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1965); see also Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,
443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979).
9 Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270.
9' United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (quoting 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2192 (3d ed. 1940)); see also Blackmer v.
United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932).
92 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
" Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 379-80. Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, stated:
The Constitution nowhere mentions any right of access to a criminal trial on the
part of the public; its guarantee, like the others enumerated, is personal to the
accused.... Our cases have uniformly recognized the public-trial guarantee as
one created for the benefit of the defendant .... There is not the slightest sug-
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innocently accused, that they may not become the victim of an unjust prose-
cution, as well as the guilty, that they may be awarded a fair trial."' 94
1. The Right to Publish
The Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized the importance of the
press in the effective administration of justice. In their own words, the Court
has found that "[a] responsible press has always been regarded as the hand-
maiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal
field ... . The press does not simply publish information about trials but
guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting police, prosecutors,
and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism."" Public
scrutiny is often aroused by the free press, which acts as a "mighty catalyst
in awakening public interest in governmental affairs .... public events,
and ... court proceedings."96
The important role of the press in informing the public and serving the
interests of fairness and justice in criminal trials is embodied and preserved
in the First Amendment guarantee of a free press.97 Nevertheless, the Su-
preme Court has found that the First Amendment does not invalidate the
enforcement of civil or criminal laws that may burden the press when such
laws serve substantial public interests.98 The press does not possess a right
gestion ... that there is any correlative right in members of the public to insist
upon a public trial.
Id. at 381; see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 848 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) ("[T]he specific guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are personal to the ac-
cused .... "); Estes, 381 U.S. at 588 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("Thus the right of 'public
trial' is not one belonging to the public, but one belonging to the accused, and inhering
in the institutional process by which justice is administered."); id. at 583 (Warren, C.J.,
concurring) ("[T]he public trial provision of the Sixth Amendment is a 'guarantee to an
accused' . . . [and] a necessary component of an accused's right to a fair trial .... ").
9" Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270 n.25 (quoting People v. Morrey, 50 N.W. 995, 998 (Mich.
1891)).
" Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
96 Estes, 381 U.S. at 539. Because few citizens can attend trials on a regular basis
and only a few citizens have the opportunity to serve as jurors in any given case, the
public regularly relies on the media to serve as independent or surrogate auditors of the
justice system. Marc 0. Litt, "Citizen-Soldiers" or Anonymous Justice: Reconciling the
Sixth Amendment Right of the Accused, the First Amendment Right of the Media and
the Privacy Right of Jurors, 25 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 371, 372 (1992).
" "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press ..... U.S. CONST. amend. I. This portion of the First Amendment has been made
applicable to the States by way of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. See,
e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,
707 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
" See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972).
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to "publish with impunity everything and anything it desires to publish." 99
The Court has addressed the necessity for limiting the freedom of the
press in the context of judicial proceedings. Accordingly, the Court has
favored trial publicity only to the extent that injustice is not done to persons
immediately concerned, namely, the defendants and trial participants."°°
2. The Right to Gather News
The right of the press to publish necessarily implicates the right of the
press to gather information or news.'' When combined, the First Amend-
ment right of a free press and the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial
imply that the press has a right of access to criminal proceedings. In fact,
the Supreme Court held in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia"°2 that
the right of the public and press to attend criminal trials is implicit in the
First Amendment. 3 Nevertheless, like the right to publish, the right to
99 Id. at 683. In Branzburg, the Court cited limitations on the freedom of the press
including the fact that "the press may not circulate knowing or reckless falsehoods...
without subjecting itself to liability for damages, including punitive damages, or even
criminal prosecution." Id. (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-
80 (1964)); see also Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 284 (1941) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) ("[Tihe Bill of Rights is not self-destructive. Freedom of expression can
hardly carry implications that nullify the guarantees of impartial trials.... The need is
great that courts be criticized, but just as great that they be allowed to do their duty.").
'o Estes, 381 U.S. at 542.
202 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 727 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("A corollary of the right
to publish must be the right to gather news.").
202 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
I3 d. at 581 (holding that "[aibsent an overriding interest articulated in findings, the
trial of a criminal case must be open to the public"). The Court determined:
From [the] unbroken, uncontradicted history [of granting public access to criminal
trials in the United States], supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries
past, we are bound to conclude that a presumption of openness inheres in the very
nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice.
Id. at 573. Although recognizing that no such right is specifically enumerated in the
First Amendment or elsewhere in the Bill of Rights or the Constitution, the Court ex-
plained:
The Bill of Rights was enacted against the backdrop of the long history of trials
being presumptively open .... In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech
and press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to
attend trials so as to give meaning to those explicit guarantees .... Free speech
carries with it some freedom to listen.... What this means in the context of
trials is that the First Amendment guarantees of speech and press, standing alone,
prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom doors ....
Id. at 575-76 (citations omitted). Although the opinion in Richmond Newspapers repre-
sented only a plurality, a majority of the Court was later able to find a constitutional
right of access to criminal trials in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S.
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gather news and the right of access to the courtroom are not absolute.1 14
The Supreme Court directly addressed this limitation by quoting from the
Estes v. Texas amicus curiae brief of the National Association of Broadcast-
ers and the Radio and Television News Directors Association:
"[N]either of these two amendments [First and Sixth] speaks
of an unlimited right of access to the courtroom on the part
of the broadcasting media" . . . . [T]he "primary concern of
all must be the proper administration of justice." . . . "[T]he
life or liberty of any individual in this land should not be put
into jeopardy because of actions of any news media."'0 5
A delicate balance must be struck between preserving the right of crim-
inal defendants to a fair trial and preserving the right of the press to publish
and gather information."° "While maximum freedom must be allowed the
press in carrying on this important function in a democratic society[,] its
exercise must necessarily be subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness
in the judicial process."'0 7 The freedom of the press clearly must be coun-
terbalanced by the fairness of the judicial process. By use of the words
"absolute fairness,"'8 the Court further implied that, when threatened, the
Sixth Amendment right of defendants necessarily outweighs or trumps the
right to freedom of the press."
596 (1982). The Court in Globe regarded this right as a subset to the more general right
to gather information that was recognized in Richmond Newspapers. Globe, 457 U.S. at
611; see also RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH
§ 13.0212][b][i] (1994).
"n Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) (observing that "the right to speak and pub-
lish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information"). In Radio &
Television News Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 781 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1986), the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals characterized the right of access to criminal trials as
nothing more than the "right to sit, listen, watch, and report." Id. at 1446 (citing Rich-
mond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576).
05 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539-40 (1965) (alteration in original) (quoting
Amicus Brief of the National Association of Broadcasters and the Radio Television
News Directors Association at 7, Estes (No. 256)).
" See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972). "We do not question the
significance of free speech, press, or assembly to the country's welfare. Nor is it sug-
gested that news gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without
some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated."
Id.
107 Estes, 381 U.S. at 539.
101 Id. at 539.
" See id. at 538-39; see also In re Application of Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603,
609 (2d Cir.) ("When the exercise of free press rights actually tramples upon Sixth
Amendment rights, the former must nonetheless yield to the latter."), cert. denied sub
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Despite the fact that the presence of a free press often preserves the
fairness and effectiveness of judicial administration,"' there are instances
where the public, and thus the press, has no right of access. As the United
States Supreme Court noted, "[iut has generally been held that the First
Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special
access to information not available to the public generally. 11. The limits
on press access to information include their exclusion from, inter alia, grand
jury proceedings and Supreme Court conferences." 2 "Newsmen have no
constitutional right of access to the scenes of crime or disaster when the
general public is excluded, and they may be prohibited from attending or
publishing information about trials if such restrictions are necessary to
assure a defendant a fair trial before an impartial tribunal.""' 3 The man-
ner in which the press goes about gathering news may also be restricted or
even punished by courts." 4
3. The Effect of Sections 116.5 and 132.5 on the Press
The press is not completely fettered by sections 116.5 and 132.5 from
obtaining the stories of jurors and witnesses involved in criminal trials.
Restrictions against conferring payment, benefit, or other consideration to
jurors exist only through the first ninety days following discharge of the
jury." 5 Likewise, the press is limited only in making offerings to witnesses
prior to the conclusion of the trial."6 Nevertheless, sections 116.5 and
132.5 ensure that prior to the conclusion of the trial, the press may only re-
ceive information from jurors and witnesses willing to forego remuneration.
Depending on the news media, this serves as a substantial limit to the means
of gathering information." 7 The statutes effectively circumscribe the
nom. Dow Jones & Co. v. Simon, 488 U.S. 946 (1988).
"' See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
.. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972) (citing Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1,
16-17 (1965); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728-30 (1971)); see
also Estes, 381 U.S. at 589 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that "within [the courthouse
door], a reporter's constitutional rights are no greater than those of any other member of
the public").
112 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684.
"3 Id. at 684-85 (emphasis added).
"4 "A newspaper or journalist may also be punished for contempt of court, in appro-
priate circumstances." Id. at 684 (citing Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 377-78 (1947)).
"5 CAL. PEN. CODE § 116.5(a) (West Supp. 1995).
116 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 132.5(d) (Senate), 132.5(f) (Assembly) (West Supp. 1995).
Witnesses are also prohibited from exchanging information for pay or benefit prior to
one year from the date of the criminal act relating to their information. Id. §§ 132.5(d)
(Senate), 132.5(f) (Assembly).
.. The tabloid sector of the news media is most clearly affected by the financial
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means by which the press or others may obtain information from jurors and
witnesses.
In KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Superior Court,"8 the Arizona Supreme
Court reviewed the constitutionality of a court order limiting the means by
which the press could interview trial witnesses. During a highly publicized
murder trial, the Superior Court for the County of Maricopa ordered that
"no ... jurors or other participants in this matter are to be in contact with
the media during the course of this matter.""' 9 The order also appointed a
member of the county court administrator's staff as "court media liaison" to
handle media inquiries "so that there [would] be a unified and singular
source for the media concerning [the] proceedings."'2 Unlike the concern
over tainting of jurors' impartiality and witnesses' testimony in sections
116.5 and 132.5, the court order in this case was instigated to protect trial
participants from known organized crime and gang activity.' 2' The Arizona
Supreme Court found:
The order in no way infringed upon [the press's] First
Amendment right to attend and report on criminal trials, but
only collaterally affected [the press's] ability to interview the
trial participants, an interest outside the scope of protection
of the First Amendment right to attend and report on crim-
inal trials.
2
The court in KPNX Broadcasting relied heavily on Sheppard v. Maxwell and
other cases in supporting the authority of the trial court to limit the means
by which the media acquires information in order to preserve the
defendant's right to a fair trial.
The petitioners in KPNX Broadcasting cited CBS, Inc. v. Young 24 as
supporting their claim to invalidate the gag order. In Young, the Sixth Cir-
cuit struck down an order entered by the trial judge enjoining all parties
concerned with the litigation, including their relatives, close friends, and
associates, from discussing in any manner the case with the news media or
limitations of §§ 116.5 and 132.5. Most reputable news organizations supposedly frown
on "checkbook journalism." Jesse Katz, Participants in King Case Try to Cash In, L.A.
TIMEs, Apr. 25, 1993, at Al. But see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
18 678 P.2d 431 (Ariz. 1984).
"9 Id. at 434.
20 Id. The order also concluded that "no other source of information will come from
participants in these proceedings." Id.
2I Id. at 439.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 439-40.
124 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975).
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public."2 The federal court of appeals decided that the order was an inval-
id prior restraint.'26 The Arizona Supreme Court distinguished Young from
its own holding in KPNX Broadcasting, noting that the order issued in
Young was much broader in duration and scope as to the persons enjoined,
and that the court in Young found the evidence did not justify a restraint of
speech of trial participants.' Furthermore, the court found that the "news
gathering right" in the context of criminal trials means nothing more nor
less than the right to attend. 2 a
Under this rationale, the limitations placed on the media by sections
116.5 and 132.5 as to gathering information from jurors and witnesses seem
minimal. The media may still gather information from witnesses by attend-
ing trials or by requesting information from witnesses without offering or
conferring payment, benefit, or other forms of consideration. -Furthermore,
because the media does not necessarily have the right to interview jurors
during the course of a trial, 29 media access to a juror's speech is not en-
cumbered to any greater extent.
C. Freedom of Speech: Rights and Interests of Jurors and Witnesses
To some extent, California Penal Code Sections 116.5 and 132.5 en-
croach upon jurors' and witnesses' First Amendment rights to free
speech. 30 By imposing potential financial burdens and criminal charges on
jurors and witnesses based on the content of their speech, the statutes create
a disincentive to speak.' 3'
Any time prior to or within ninety days of discharge, a juror may not
communicate information concerning the trial in exchange for payment. 32
Likewise, a witness to an event or occurrence with personal knowledge of
facts that may require him or her to be called as a witness may not relay
,25 Id. at 236.
126 Id. at 240.
,2' KPNX Broadcasting, 678 P.2d at 440.
128 Id. at 441 (citing United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278, 1280 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, sub nom. Post-Newsweek Stations, Inc. v. United States, 461 U.S. 931 (1983)).
129 See infra Part II.C.4.a; see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1121 (West 1985) (permit-
ting sequestration of jurors and prohibiting their speaking or communicating with any-
one concerning the trial).
30 See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 116.5, 132.5 (Senate and Assembly) (West Supp.
1995).
,'3 Cf. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1013
(1995) (noting that Ethics in Government Act prohibited receipt of honoraria by govern-
ment employees); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (observing that New York statute prevented some ac-
cused and convicted criminals from profiting from speech relating to their crimes).
132 CAL. PEN. CODE § 116.5(a).
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information concerning their observations or personal knowledge in ex-
change for pay or other consideration. 33 This moratorium is in place until
one year from the date of the criminal act, or if prosecution has been in-
stituted, until final judgment has been rendered.' In order to survive con-
stitutional challenges, these content-based restrictions on the free speech
rights of jurors and witnesses must serve a compelling governmental interest
and be narrowly tailored-that is, employ the least restrictive means-to
meet that interest.'
35
This constitutional test of content-based speech regulation served as the
basis for the Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board,36 which overturned
New York's "Son of Sam" law.137 The "Son of Sam" law required that
accused or convicted criminals' income from works describing their crimes
be deposited in an escrow account, the funds of which were then made
available to the criminals' victims and other creditors.138 The statute effec-
tively prohibited criminals or accused persons from profiting through sales
of information or stories concerning their crimes. The Court found the "Son
of Sam" law to be a content-based statute that served as a financial
disincentive to speak. 139 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for a unani-
mous Court, held that the statute was presumptively inconsistent with the
133 Id. §§ 132.5(a) (Senate), 132.5(b)-(c) (Assembly).
'a CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 132.5(a), (d) (Senate), 132.5(b)-(c), (f) (Assembly).
'~' See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. at 1013 (holding that
the Act's prohibition did not serve the government's interest in assuring that federal
officers not misuse or appear to misuse power by accepting compensation for their
unofficial and nonpolitical writing and speaking activities); Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S.
at 120-21, 123 (holding that state had a compelling interest in compensating crime
victims but little interest in limiting the source of such compensation to the profits de-
rived from the speech of criminals concerning their crimes); see also SMOLLA, supra
note 103, § 3.03[l].
136 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
137 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1991), repealed by 1992
N.Y. Laws ch. 618, § 10, and replaced by N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1992-
93).
"' Id. The statute arose out of the notorious "Son of Sam" serial murders that oc-
curred in New York City in the summer of 1977. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 108.
The rights to the story of killer David Berkowitz were worth a substantial amount by
the time he had been identified and apprehended. Id. Seeing the opportunity for
Berkowitz to profit from his notoriety, the New York legislature moved quickly to pass
the law, which did not criminalize the receipt of payment by criminals in exchange for
their stories, but merely required that the funds be redirected to the Crime Victims
Board in those cases where the victims had moved for the funds. Id. at 108-10.
9 Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 116.
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First Amendment and that the statute was not narrowly tailored to achieve
the state's objective in compensating victims from the profits of crime.1"
Because Simon & Schuster involved "prior restraints" in the form of
financial disincentives against speech, it serves as an appropriate backdrop
for later discussion of the constitutionality of sections 116.5 and 132.5.
Numerous key distinctions exist between New York's "Son of Sam" law, as
analyzed by the Supreme Court, and the newly enacted sections to the Cali-
fornia Penal Code. Those distinctions lie in the relationship between the
compelling governmental interests and the scope of the statutes designed to
meet those interests.
1. Prior Restraints and Subsequent Punishments
Sections 116.5 and 132.5 of the California Penal Code essentially forbid
trading speech that concerns information pertaining to criminal trials in ex-
change for money before the trial concludes. In effect, the statutes serve as
de facto content-based prior restraints on speech. Although the statutes are
not forms of prior restraint in the traditional sense,"' the subsequent pun-
ishment threatened by these statutes has the same effect of "chilling
speech." 42
140 Id. at 123.
... According to Professor Smolla in his treatise on freedom of speech, "prior re-
straint" refers to judicial orders or administrative rules which operate to forbid expres-
sion before it takes place. SMOLLA, supra note 103, § 8.01[1]. These rules can take the
form of requirements for a license or permit before allowing individuals to engage in
expressive activity; an example of another form would be a judicial order directing an
individual not to engage in expression on pain of contempt. Id.
In contrast, "subsequent punishments" refer to the imposition of penalties on ex-
pression after it occurs. Id. Because §§ 116.5 and 132.5 provide only for punishment of
speech by jurors and witnesses after the speech occurs, they are "subsequent punish-
ments" rather than "prior restraints." Section 1122, however, requires judges to admon-
ish jury members after being sworn in and prior to the people's opening address not to
agree upon or accept payment in exchange for information; thus, § 1122 more closely
resembles the traditional notion of a prior restraint. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1122
(West Supp. 1985).
42 From the perspective of individuals wishing to engage in expressive activity, the
effect of a court order (prior restraint) and a statute (subsequent punishment) is the
same: both threaten criminal prosecution for their violations if individuals subsequently
engage in speech activity. SMOLLA, supra note 103, § 8.02[1]. Nevertheless, in the
abstract sense, subsequent punishments may be preferable to prior restraints because,
unlike the immediate and irreversible sanctions imposed under prior restraints, subse-
quent punishment delays the regulation's impact until all harm caused by the expressive
activity is known and all appellate review is exhausted. Michael E. Swartz, Trial Partic-
ipant Speech Restrictions: Gagging First Amendment Rights, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1411,
1430 (1990). This ultimately reduces the chance of erroneous speech suppression. Id. In
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The Supreme Court has stated:
prior restraints on speech and publication are the most seri-
ous and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights.... The damage can be particularly great when the
prior restraint falls upon the communication of news and
commentary on current events. Truthful reports of public
judicial proceedings have been afforded special protection
against subsequent punishment.'43
Nevertheless, in spite of presumptions against their use, prior restraints
can serve a valuable purpose in judicial proceedings. In certain circumstanc-
es, prior restraints used to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial are rec-
ognized as one of the few permissible exceptions to the presumption against
their use." The degree of permissible control of the speech of participants
the words of the Supreme Court, while "a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after
publication [i.e., subsequent punishment] 'chills' speech, prior restraint 'freezes' it."
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
113 Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 559; see also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469, 492-93 (1975); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947). See generally
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (finding that the govern-
ment had not met its burden of showing justification for injunctions preventing publica-
tion of the classified Pentagon Papers in the New York Times and Washington Post);
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971) (lifting injunction
against peaceful distribution of informational pamphlets); Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (declaring unconstitutional a state tax imposed on publications
that was designed to limit the circulation of information); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697 (1931) (declaring unconstitutional a state statute that imposed a prior restraint on
publication by those engaged in customarily publishing defamatory newspapers).
" See SMOLLA, supra note 103, § 8.0[1l]; see, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S.
1030 (1991) (stating that state interest in fair trials balanced against First Amendment
rights of attorneys in pending cases allows prohibition of trial participants' extrajudicial
statements when "substantial likelihood of material prejudice is shown"); In re Appli-
cation of Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.) (finding that "gag" order on trial
participants restricting their public discussion pertaining to a third party was not a prior
restraint and was justified given the pretrial publicity), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946
(1988); Radio & Television News Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 781 F.2d 1443
(9th Cir. 1986) (upholding court order restraining trial counsel from making extrajudi-
cial statements to the media); In re Russell, 726 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir.) (upholding "gag"
order, issued due to tremendous trial publicity, potentially inflammatory and highly
prejudicial statements, and lack of effective alternatives, which prohibited potential
witnesses from speaking to the media), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837 (1984). But see, e.g.,
In re New York Times Co., 878 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1989) (overturning district court order
enjoining state counsel from discussing case with defendant's customers and the press);
In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1982) (overturning district court rule
prohibiting the interviewing of jurors concerning their deliberations or verdict).
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in criminal proceedings may depend on such variables as the identity of the
participant, the nature of the statements being controlled, and the actual
degree of threat to the administration of justice posed by those state-
ments.'45
As an example, premature disclosure and weighing of evidence may
seriously jeopardize a defendant's right to an impartial jury." In Sheppard
v. Maxwell, the Court held that in a murder prosecution, a state trial judge's
failure to protect the defendant from inherently prejudicial publicity that
saturated the community deprived the defendant of a fair trial consistent
with due process. 47 During the trial, the prosecution in Sheppard repeated-
ly made available to the media evidence that was never offered in trial,
much of which was clearly inadmissible.' The Court maintained that the
exclusion of such evidence from the trial court was rendered meaningless by
the actions of the prosecution and subsequent publication by the media.49
The Court found the trial court responsible for the prejudicial effects of
the trial publicity in Sheppard:
Effective control of these sources ... might well have pre-
vented the divulgence of inaccurate information, rumors, and
accusations that made up much of the inflammatory publici-
ty, at least after Sheppard's indictment .... More specifical-
ly, the trial court might well have proscribed extrajudicial
statements by any lawyer, party, witness, or court official
which divulged prejudicial matters ...
a. Compelling Interest and Subsequent Punishment of Jurors
California undeniably has a compelling governmental interest in protect-
ing a defendant's right to a fair trial. Stemming from this compelling inter-
est is the government's concern that those individuals selected for jury duty
145 SMOLLA, supra note 103, § 8.04[4]. But see Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members
of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 117 (1991) (observing that "[t]he
Government's power to impose content-based financial disincentives on speech surely
does not vary with the identity of the speaker").
" See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361 (1966).
147 Id. at 363.
141 Id. at 360.
" Id. Examples of "evidence" excluded from the trial but leaked to and published by
the media in Sheppard include: publicity by the police detectives and the coroner of the
accused's refusal to submit to a polygraph test; a prosecution witness's story that the
accused had been called a "Jekyll-Hyde" personality by his wife; and a report that a
"bombshell witness" was ready to testify as to the accused's "fiery temper." Id. at 360-
61.
110 Id. at 361.
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must serve the interests of justice by remaining impartial and free from
improper influences. 1' Juror impartiality can be compromised either by
consideration of information other than the evidence presented at trial' or
by disruptions that cloud a juror's objectivity in weighing the sufficiency of
the evidence presented by the prosecution.'53
No requirement exists that a qualified juror be "totally ignorant of the
facts" of a case. 5' Rather, a juror must merely be able to maintain impar-
tiality and decide a case based on the evidence presented in court. 55 In
high-publicity cases, the release of information by the news media before
jury selection and trial can taint the ability of jurors to be impartial in
weighing the evidence presented in court. To avoid the empanelment of
biased jurors and their threat to a fair trial, a trial may be subject to a
change of venue, or its potential jurors may be struck by prosecutors and
defense attorneys during voir dire."56 Journalists and civil libertarians who
'51 See OSBORN, supra note 34, at 1. Jurors are vested with tremendous responsibility
that determines not only the outcome of trials, but also in a greater sense the direction
of society. As de Tocqueville observed:
The institution of the jury may be aristocratic or democratic, according to the
class from which the jurors are taken; but it always preserves its republican char-
acter, in that it places the real direction of society in the hands of the governed, or
of a portion of the governed, and not in that of the government .... The true
sanction of political laws is to be found in penal legislation.... He who punishes
the criminal is therefore the real master of society. Now, the institution of the jury
raises the people itself, or at least a class of citizens, to the bench of judges. The
institution of the jury consequently invests the people, or that class of citizens,
with the direction of society.
1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 282 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1956)
(1835).
152 FRANK W. MILLER ET AL., PROSECUTION AND ADJUDICATION 811 (4th ed. 1991).
"' Id. The objectivity of a juror can be compromised or nullified by prejudice,
whether in the form of sympathy, antipathy, or desire for profit. See OSBORN, supra
note 34, at 16.
's Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800 (1975).
'5 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961) (observing that "[i]t is sufficient if the
juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence
presented in court"). The test is "whether the nature and strength of the opinion formed
are such as the law necessarily ... raises the presumption of partiality." Id. (quoting
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156 (1878)).
156 A prosecutor or defense attorney may challenge an objectionable juror in any of
three ways: "(1) to the array, if counsel feels that the entire panel has been irregularly
selected; (2) for cause, when a juror is deemed unable to render an impartial verdict
because of his experience, occupation, personal or financial interests, or preconceived
bias; and (3) [under] peremptory [challenge, i.e., without stating cause], if counsel feels
for any reason that the juror is undesirable." RITA J. SIMON, THE JURY SYSTEM IN
AMERICA: A CRITICAL OVERVIEw 50 (1975) (emphasis removed and added).
The Supreme Court has suggested the use of a vast array of techniques to prevent
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feel that "gag orders" violate the freedom of the press contend that an unbi-
ased jury can be secured by these techniques.157 These methods, however,
are not foolproof, and they are aimed at preventing empanelment of jurors
having impressions or opinions that disable them from rendering a verdict
based solely on the evidence presented in court.
By singling out the act of agreeing upon or receiving payment for infor-
mation relating to jury duty, California's newly enacted section 116.5 targets
the financial motivations of jurors, not necessarily their impressions or opin-
ions. 5' The trial of O.J. Simpson, concern for which contributed to the en-
actment of section 116.5, raised fears that potential jurors might be enticed
to lie in order to get on the jury in the hopes of cashing in on trial publici-
ty. 59 The jury foreman in the federal trial that convicted two police offi-
cers of beating Rodney King was reportedly able to cash in on his participa-
tion in the trial; he allegedly offered to sell his story to A Current Affair and
was rejected but later appeared on the show's competitor Inside Edition for
an undisclosed sum.16°
This behavior leads some to believe that a juror in a high-profile case
"might try to play a role during deliberations that would whet the tabloids
[sic] appetite later on.W61 These concerns over jury dynamics are for the
empanelment of partial jurors and to prevent jurors already empaneled from developing
biases. In addition to changes of venue and extensive voir dire, these suggestions have
included brief stays, sequestration, and court admonitions not to read, watch, or listen to
news reports. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563-65 (1976);
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 364 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966).
' See RESEARCH AND INFORMATION SERVICE, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE
COURTS, FACETS OF THE JURY SYSTEM: A SURVEY 24 (1976).
5.. California Governor Pete Wilson claimed that enacting §§ 116.5 and 132.5 into
law would "'ensure that witnesses and jurors are a force for justice, not fodder for tab-
loids."' Ingram, supra note 30, at A21. The governor argued that the immense trial
publicity surrounding the Simpson trial demonstrated that the legal system has become a
"'clearinghouse for hearsay, idle gossip and rumor-mongering about the lifestyles of the
rich and famous."' Id.
' These suspicions were raised by the fact that so many prospective jurors seemed
enthusiastic and willing to serve in a trial despite the fact that the trial could disrupt
their lives for six months or more. See Andrea Ford & Jim Newton, Jurors More Avail-
able Than Expected, Ito Says, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1994, at Al, A34. According to
Lois Haney, a trial consultant of the National Jury Project, prospective jurors in high-
profile cases may perceive their service as "'a ticket to fame or sequestration,"' and that
although "'many people will avoid service[,] ... a very small group of people ... will
be attracted to the fanfare."' Henry Weinstein & Tim Rutten, Simpson Case Already Is
Rewriting the Rule Book, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 1995, at Al. The prospect of cashing in
on a high-profile case is very real. According to Publisher's Weekly, five of the 15 or
more books concerning the O.J. Simpson trial have become bestsellers. Id.
"6 Jesse Katz, Money Helps Appease Memory of Misery from King Beating Case,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1993, at Al.
161 Maura Dolan, Impartial Jurors Can Be Found, Court Experts Say, L.A. TIMES,
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most part speculative because analysis of real juries in deliberations is ille-
gal.162 In an attempt to prevent jurors with hidden agendas 163 from being
empaneled in high-profile cases and tainting open and impartial delibera-
tions, the threat of subsequent punishment under section 116.5 acts as a
prior restraint on juror speech.
b. Compelling Interest and Subsequent Punishment of Witnesses
Section 132.5 effectively controls the release of information that may be
prejudicial to defendants and therefore inadmissible at trial. 64 Journalists
seeking increased sales of newspapers or increased shares of a television
audience often report sensationalist stories to satisfy the seemingly insatiable
curiosity of the public.1 65 A vast difference can exist between information
that meets the media's and public's threshold requirement of sensationalism
and that which meets the requirements of admissibility in a court of law.
A valid concern exists for the veracity of statements made by criminal
trial witnesses induced by the lure of profit. If the statements of witnesses
under such circumstances are prone to hyperbole, overdramatization, or
fabrication, then section 132.5 can only serve to limit the prejudicial effect
of such statements on defendants in criminal trials. The effect of the statute
July 9, 1994, at Al, A19. Although a foreman may be selected to serve as the jury's
representative leader in announcing the verdict, this person may not be the most influ-
ential jury member; other jurors may emerge as leaders or compete for control during
the deliberation process, depending on group dynamics. See SIMON, supra note 156, at
81-82.
162 SIMON, supra note 156, at 86. The only means of ascertaining juror conduct is
through post-trial interviews. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 1508 (1988) prohibits the re-
cording of, listening to, or observing of actual grand or petit juries during deliberations
or voting. Id. California also makes the act of recording, listening to, or observing of
jury deliberations or voting a misdemeanor. CAL. PENAL CODE § 167 (West 1988); id.
§ 891 (West Supp. 1995). Similar statutes exist in other states. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 21-235 (1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 705, para. 315/1 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:129.2 (West 1986); MINN. STAT. § 631.09 (1983 &
Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 588 (West 1983).
63 See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text: "A man may sit as a silent juror
day after day and look quite human but in the first few minutes of a jury conference he
may begin to show just what he is." OSBORN, supra note 34, at 163.
"6 Information that may be relevant to a case may be nonetheless held inadmissible
at trial. For example, under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, "[a]lthough
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403.
65 See Stuart Nagel et al., Free Press-Fair Trial: An Introduction, 20 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 640, 641 (1976); Sheryl A. Bjork, Comment, Indirect Gag Orders and the Doctrine
of Prior Restraint, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 165, 167 (1989).
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would be to discourage witnesses from exchanging information for pay in
the first place, thus better preserving the value of their testimony at trial by
removing a means of impeaching it. In the rare case where a witness ex-
changed information for pay, benefit, or other consideration, prosecutors and
defense attorneys might be discouraged from putting such impeachable
witnesses on the stand, thus promoting trial efficiency."
2. Imposing Financial Burdens
The Supreme Court has found the statutory financial burdens imposed as
a penalty to disfavored speech to be presumptively inconsistent with the
First Amendment.167 The Court has also considered government regula-
tions that discriminate on the basis of content of the message to be intolera-
ble. 6 ' According to the Court in Leathers v. Medlock:.69
The constitutional right of free expression is ... intended to
remove governmental restraints from the arena of public
discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be
voiced largely in the hands of each of us ... in the belief
that no other approach would comport with the premise of
individual dignity and choice upon which our political sys-
tem rests.' 70
The Court has also voiced concern that "the Government's ability to
impose content-based burdens on speech raises the specter that the Govern-
ment may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the market-
place.""'' These concerns were central to the Supreme Court's decision in
Simon & Schuster, overturning New York's "Son of Sam" law.
California Penal Code Sections 116.5 and 132.5 are analogous to the
New York law because they prohibit jurors, witnesses, and others from prof-
iting through sales of information concerning their roles in trials. Although
this analogy might at first glance spell certain demise for California's recent
legislation, there are significant differences in purpose and scope of the
statutes that distinguish the California statutes from the failed New York
legislation. These differences merit further examination to ascertain whether
" Naturally, there would be a corresponding risk that valuable, relevant evidence
would be lost by non-presentation to the jury.
167 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 115 (1991) (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991)).
" Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984).
169 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
170 Id. at 448-49.
"7 Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 116.
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the statutes are narrowly tailored to meet the state's compelling interests and
thus whether these financial burdens should better withstand constitutional
scrutiny.
3. Narrow Tailoring: A Comparison with Simon & Schuster
a. Overbreadth of Application
In Simon & Schuster, the Court found that the "Son of Sam" law de-
fined too broadly those persons to whom the statute applied. 72 By defini-
tion, the statute applied to any "person convicted of a crime in [New York]
either by entry of a plea of guilty or by conviction after trial and any person
who has voluntarily and intelligently admitted the commission of a crime for
which such person is not prosecuted."' 3 Had the law been upheld it would
have penalized those persons who sold stories based on crimes they claimed
to have committed but for which they may not have even been tried. As a
result of the overly broad definition of who had committed a crime, the
statute would have enabled the Crime Victims Board to escrow payment for
works by people such as Malcolm X, Henry David Thoreau, Saint Augus-
tine, Martin Luther King, and Sir Walter Raleigh.
17 4
Conversely, under California's legislation, the persons to whom the
restrictions would apply appear more clearly defined: jurors and crime wit-
nesses, potential or actual; persons acting on behalf of jurors; and those
individuals making offers to jurors.'75 At first glance the statutes appear to
be more limited in scope than the New York "Son of Sam" law that was
rejected in Simon & Schuster, because the California statutes apply only to
those persons who would be involved, or who should reasonably believe
that they would be involved, in actual criminal trials.176 Nevertheless, even
these definitions should fail on overbreadth grounds.
i. Section 116.5 Should Not Apply to Excused Jurors
According to section 116.5, violations occur "any time prior to, or with-
in 90 days of, discharge of the jury."'" Under this reading, even a juror
discharged prior to deliberations would be subject to prosecution for a viola-
172 Id. at 115-16.
"I N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(10)(b) (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1991), repealed by
1992 N.Y. Laws ch. 618, § 10, and replaced by N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney
1992-93).
' See Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 121-22.
'71 See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 116.5(a)(1)-(3), 132.5(a) (Senate), 132.5(b)-(c) (Assem-
bly) (West Supp. 1995).
176 See id. §§ 116.5(a)(1)-(3), 132.5(a) (Senate), 132.5(b)-(c) (Assembly).
I77 d. § 116.5(a) (emphasis added).
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tion of section 116.5. Such a juror, however, would not present the same
threats to the integrity of the judicial process because the act of agreeing to
accept or accepting payment in exchange for her story would not have any
bearing on the bias of those remaining jurors who will eventually deliberate
the defendant's guilt or innocence. As the court observed in Dove Audio,
Inc. v. Lungren, once a juror is excused from duty, the state no longer has
an interest in ensuring that individual's objectivity and freedom from outside
influences because that ex-juror will no longer play a role in delibera-
tions.'
In Dove Audio, plaintiffs Michael Knox and Dove Audio, Inc. had
sought to enter into an agreement under which Michael Knox would write a
book to be published by Dove Audio regarding his experiences and impres-
sions as a juror in the O.J. Simpson double-murder trial.'79 Knox had been
discharged from jury duty five weeks into the trial.' In early April, Los
Angeles District Attorney Gil Garcetti informed the plaintiffs that they
would be charged with a violation of section 116.5 if they proceeded to
enter into an agreement concerning the publishing of Knox's book.'8'
Knox and Dove Audio sought an injunction against Garcetti and California
State Attorney General Daniel Lungren to preclude their prosecution under
section 116.5.82 The court found the statute to be unconstitutionally
overbroad and vague as applied specifically to Knox because the state could
no longer claim a compelling interest in a person that was no longer a par-
ticipant in a criminal trial.8 3
Furthermore, in addition to the court's rationale, the public may hold an
interest in the information that an excused juror might have to offer based
on that juror's perceptions of the trial process, its fairness, and expected
outcome. The excusal of a juror from duty offers the public what may be a
rare occasion to gain insight into the jury system prior to the conclusion of
the trial. Although the state might assert an interest in shielding the remain-
ing jurors from being influenced by the media's account of the discharged
juror's opinion of the case, this concern can be more carefully attended to
by shielding the remaining jurors from selective media reports, rather than
barring an individual from speaking and thus inhibiting the public from
gaining intermediate insight into the trial and the jury system.
78 Dove Audio, Inc. v. Lungren, No. CV 95-2570 RG (JRX), 1995 WL 432631, at
*2-3 (C.D. Cal. June 14, 1995).




183 Id. at *2-3. The court limited its ruling to the applicability of § 116.5 as against
the particular plaintiffs and did not address the constitutionality of the section as applied
to jurors not discharged from their duties. Id. at *3, *6.
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ii. Vagueness: Section 132.5 Should Not Apply to Witnesses Reaping
De Minimis Benefits or Rewards
The Supreme Court has found vague regulations of speech unconstitu-
tional based partly on the need "to eliminate the impermissible risk of dis-
criminatory enforcement."' 84  In order for a statute to be found
impermissibly vague, it is not necessary to find that discriminatory enforce-
ment actually occurred; rather, the possibility need only exist that the impre-
cise law could lead to discriminatory enforcement.'85 A statute that is sub-
ject to potential discriminatory enforcement fails to give proper notice to
those against whom it can be enforced, leaving such individuals to guess at
the contours of the law and its enforcement.
86
California Penal Code Section 132.5 is vague with regard to the terms of
payment, benefit, money, or other consideration.' 87 These terms are so
broad that almost any form of benefit could be considered sufficient to
trigger a prosecution under section 132.5. Benefits to those interviewed by
journalists are not limited to payment of money and can take the form of
providing transportation to bring the person to the journalist, buying lunch,
promising the interviewee that his or her name will appear prominently in
print or on television, or, conversely, promising to maintain the witness's
anonymity. Not all of these forms of benefit could have been a source of
concern for the California legislature when it enacted section 132.5. As the
court in California First Amendment Coalition observed, "[i]t is difficult to
understand how such de minimis benefits would have a deleterious effect on
a witness' [sic] credibility at trial."' 88 Thus, section 132.5 should be
recrafted to make exceptions for those individuals who are conferred with a
benefit of anonymity or reasonable compensation in the form of travel or
other accommodations reasonably necessary to impart their information.
Beyond the arguments set forth by CFAC and adopted in the court's
opinion, section 132.5 is problematic in that it was intended to thwart check-
book journalism, yet it proscribes other forms of payment for information.
For example, a defendant would be unable to post a reward for exculpatory
184 Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1051 (1991).
85 Id. In California First Amendment Coalition v. Lungren, No. C 95-0440-FMS,
1995 WL 482066 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 1995), the Court used this rationale to allow the
plaintiffs, CFAC, to assert hypothetical and speculative applications of California Penal
Code § 132.5 and California Civil Code § 1669.7. See id. at *3 (citing United States v.
National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1010 (1995); Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 121-22 (1991));
Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 957-58 (1984).
186 See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1048-49.
117 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
88 California First Amendment Coalition, 1995 WL 482066, at *8 (considering that
such "benefits" as witness anonymity would be barred by the statute).
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information. This result seems somewhat perverse considering the excep-
tions that allow the state to confer a benefit upon a witness bearing inculpa-
tory information. 9 The benefits that the state can and does occasionally
confer on witnesses bearing inculpatory information include not only mone-
tary payment but also the fruits of plea bargaining and other agreements,
such as immunity from prosecution, reduction of charges, or commuting of
sentences. The jury has the ability to weigh the credibility of witnesses who
have been put on the stand by the state and have received benefits from the
state. This ability to assess the credibility of witnesses is safeguarded by
California Evidence Code Sections 761, 780, and 785, which provide for the
cross-examination of witnesses in all criminal cases."9 If jurors are in-
structed on how to evaluate witness credibility, 9 then there is no logic in
shielding them from witnesses that section 132.5 seeks to eliminate based
solely on the potential for bias; jurors are presumed to be able to identify
witness bias and evaluate testimony accordingly.
b. Time of Application
With respect to the window of potential prosecution, the time restrictions
of the California statutes should better withstand constitutional scrutiny than
did the time restriction under New York's "Son of Sam" law. Under the
"Son of Sam" law, criminals would never have been able to profit from any
speech even hinting at their crime in any medium of communication so long
as any victim recovered a money judgment within five years of establishing
the escrow account. 92 As a result, the Court found New York's "Son of
Sam" law to be overinclusive in defining to whom and how long the statute
applied.193
In contrast, under the new California statutes, jurors and witnesses are
not subjected to nearly as great a restriction in the time during which they
may not profit. Jurors are only restricted prior to and within ninety days of
' Section 132.5 specifically makes exceptions for "[1]awful compensation provided
to an informant by a prosecutor or law enforcement agency" or "[s]tatutorily authorized
rewards offered by governmental agencies for information leading to the arrest and
conviction of specified offenders." CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 132.5(e)(1), (4) (Sen-
ate), 132.5(g)(1), (4) (Assembly) (West Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
'90 CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 761, 780, 785 (West 1995); see also California First
Amendment Coalition, 1995 WL 482066, at *6.
'9' See California First Amendment Coalition, 1995 WL 482066, at *6 (citing 1
CALJIC Nos. 2.13, 2.20-24 (5th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1995)).
192 NY. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1991), repealed by 1992
N.Y. Laws ch. 618, § 10, and replaced by N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1992-
93).
"93 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 121-22 (1991).
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being discharged from their duties,194 and witnesses are only restricted
from profiting until one year after the commission of the crime or until final
judgment has been entered against the defendant.'95 This time period is
one in which the government's substantial interest is greatest in assuring
that the accused receives a fair trial. Jurors and witnesses still have the
ability to make profitable deals following the conclusion of the trial, provid-
ed no other court-ordered restrictions apply. Nevertheless, the burden of the
time restrictions on the ability to profit varies between jurors and witnesses.
4. Practical Considerations
Consideration of the effect of the time restrictions placed on jurors and
witnesses under sections 116.5 and 132.5, respectively, illuminates the po-
tential impracticalities of the legislation. Specifically, does the legislation
have the desired effect of preventing bias in jurors and witnesses in high-
profile criminal cases? Also, what is the net effect on jurors and witnesses
when subjected to possible prosecution for violations of sections 116.5 and
132.5 respectively?
a. Section 116.5 Is Redundant and Ineffective in Its Application
The restrictions that bar jurors from speaking until after the passage of
ninety days from discharge are unnecessary and ineffective for three rea-
sons. First, these restrictions may not curb the potential underlying motives
of jurors empaneled in high-profile cases. Second, effective means already
exist under California law to prevent jurors from speaking with others about
their roles in criminal trials. Third, the point at which these jurors are al-
lowed once again to profit from their speech is precisely the point at which
their speech has its greatest value.
However noble, the ostensible goal of section 116.5 in preventing the
empanelment of jurors with personal, ulterior, financial motives might not
be served by this restraint on juror speech. Even though jurors may not
accept, receive, or make agreements for payment relating to trial information
until ninety days after being discharged, jurors could still conceivably reflect
during deliberations on the potential financial gains awaiting them after that
period expires, a point at which they have a stronger interest in speech and
'9 CAL. PENAL CODE § 116.5(a).
Id. §§ 132.5(d) (Senate) (West Supp. 1995), 132.5(f) (Assembly).
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contact with members of the media. 96 Thus, their behavior should not be
significantly shaped or altered by section 116.5.
Additionally, the effect of a single juror's bias may be minimal or negat-
ed entirely when countered by the other members of the jury. As one com-
mentator has noted, "certainly the more obvious cases of possible prejudice
are eliminated during voir dire examination. An unfair juror who remains
will, in a jury that is a true cross-section, be neutralized by a fair-minded
majority."'97 This assumes, however, that one can achieve a true cross-
section and that those jurors composing the remainder of this cross-section
are not themselves motivated by potential financial or other gains. Arguably,
personal interest in financial gain among jurors might increase in high-pro-
file trials, especially those that are drawn out and therefore less desirable to
a potential juror.9 '
Furthermore, numerous means already exist under which a juror's
speech may be limited before discharge from jury duty. Prior to rendering a
verdict and being discharged, jurors kept in custody or sequestration are
monitored by an officer of the court who guards against jurors coming into
contact with others and communicating any aspect of the trial with those
196 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 206(a) (West Supp. 1995) (stating that "[p]rior to
discharging the jury from the case, the judge in a criminal action shall ... inform the
jurors that they have an absolute right to discuss or not to discuss the deliberation or
verdict with anyone").
Federal courts around the country have held that, after rendering a verdict, jurors
may not be restricted in making contact with others, including the media. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals has held unconstitutional a district court order forbidding any
person, including members of the news media, from contacting jurors after the return of
their verdict. United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1361-62 (9th Cir. 1978). Simi-
larly, in Journal Publishing Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1986), the court
held that a trial court's order restricting press contact with former jurors was
impermissibly overbroad. Id. at 1236-37. Finally, in In re Express-News Corp., 695
F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1982), the court held that a local district court rule prohibiting any
person from interviewing any juror concerning the deliberations or verdict of the jury,
except by leave of court, was unconstitutional as applied to interviews proposed by the
newspaper and its reporter. Id. at 811.
'9' LLOYD E. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 245 (2d
ed. 1988). But see OSBORN, supra note 34, at 22-23 (arguing that "[i]f one or two unfit
jurors can defeat justice, then, with a low average of mentality and general qualifica-
tions of the whole panel, a jury trial becomes a menace to justice if not an actual
farce").
198 Jury duty can be perceived as a penalty or great inconvenience that many pro-
spective jurors would gladly evade. For example, one commentator has stated that "jury
duty is considered to be a disagreeable penalty attaching to citizenship from which one
can secure immunity in certain ways and only those serve who cannot escape."
OSBORN, supra note 34, at 15.
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persons.'99 Jurors who are allowed to separate-that is, neither sequestered
nor kept in custody-when out of court are admonished of the same.2'
In light of these other precautions already embodied in California law
and the Professional Rules of Conduct, the limitations imposed by section
116.5 might seem redundant. Nevertheless, some merit to section 116.5
exists in removing the temptation to speak for pay prior to the conclusion of
a trial, should the opportunity arise. Also, section 116.5 further circum-
scribes the contacts jurors may have during custody, sequestration, or sepa-
ration2"' by expanding the meaning of "communicating any aspect of the
trial" to include any agreement to provide information in exchange for mon-
ey or other consideration.
The lingering hopes of gaining post-verdict fortune are not squelched by
section 116.5 because jurors will no longer be restrained from exchanging
information for pay ninety days after discharge from their duties. Theoreti-
cally, a juror's monetary interest in selling her story would not reach its
peak until after the rendering of a verdict.2 2 Prior to the trial, even during
voir dire, the value of the jurors' speech is minimal because they have yet
to begin the process of viewing and evaluating evidence at trial. During the
trial, the value of jurors' speech should increase as their trial experiences
and interactions with the court increase. A juror dismissed from the jury
should have less value placed on her partial knowledge of the trial than the
jurors who successfully serve through the completion of their duties. Thus, a
sliding scale could be visualized whereby the value of a juror's speech
would increase as she gets closer to completing her jury duty.2 3 The
juror's speech would achieve its maximum value after deliberation and
delivery of the verdict. Some might even contend that the value of juror
speech is further dependent upon the outcome of a trial.
b. Section 132.5 Imposes a High Financial Burden on Witnesses' Speech
and May Be Superfluous and Only Partially Effective
The restrictions that bar witnesses from selling their stories until com-
pletion of the trial or passage of one year from the date of the crime impose
an excessive financial burden on witnesses unlike the one borne by jurors.
Furthermore, California laws already in existence prior to the enactment of
19 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1121 (West 1985).
200 Id. An additional measure preventing jurors from influential contact exists in
regard to contact with attorneys. Regardless of whether they are connected with the
trial, attorneys in California are prohibited from contacting jurors at any time during the
course of the trial outside of official proceedings. CAL. PROF. CONDUCT RULE 5-320.
20' CAL. PENAL CODE § 1121.
202 See the Appendix at the end of this Note, which hypothesizes the value of jurors'




sections 132.5 and 1669.7 may suffice to minimize the number of witnesses
whose credibility is tainted by financial motivations. Finally, the threat of
prosecution of witnesses who accept or agree to accept payment, benefit, or
other consideration in exchange for information pertaining to criminal trials
may not prevent the tainting of all witnesses' credibility.
Although section 132.5 does not prohibit witnesses from offering infor-
mation without receiving money, benefit, or other consideration,0 4 wit-
nesses are limited as to when they may profit from such acts.25 That not-
withstanding, as discussed previously, the Supreme Court has determined
that financial burdens on speech are presumptively inconsistent with the
First Amendment."° The financial burden imposed on witnesses by sec-
tions 132.5 and 1669.7 may well be greater than that imposed on jurors
under section 116.5.207 In a practical sense, under section 132.5 the point
at which witnesses are able to sell their stories is the point at which the
value of the witnesses' information may well be at its lowest.0 8 Once a
trial is over, a witness's information that qualifies as relevant and admissible
evidence has already been revealed in court and is openly available to the
press.
During the pre-trial phase, the information-gathering activities of law
enforcement officials and the media are at their height, and the theory or
strategy for prosecution has yet to unfold. The ensuing speculation and the
media's frenzied efforts to get the "scoop" on competing news sources put a
premium on the value of witnesses' speech as it concerns information or
knowledge perceived by journalists to be potentially relevant to the trial."°
At this point, the value of a witness's speech might be based on various
factors including, among others, the likelihood that the witness will be
called to testify, the notoriety of the defendant, and the notoriety of the wit-
ness.
2 1 0
During the trial phase, the value of a witness's speech may be dimin-
ished if she is not called to testify or if she is impeached on the stand.
Moreover, if the witness's testimony in open court is permitted to be pub-
lished by the press, then the media's need to pay the witness for her infor-
204 See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 132.5(d) (Senate), 132.5(0 (Assembly) (West Supp.
1995).
201 See id. §§ 132.5(d) (Senate), 132.5(0 (Assembly).
206 See, e.g., United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003,
1014 (1995); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991); see also Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448-49 (1991);
Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230 (1987).
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mation or knowledge is negated. This undermining of the value of a
witness's testimony is extreme and amounts to a veritable bar on the
witness's ability to reap a financial gain for her "fortune" of being "in the
right place at the right time," or her knowledge of the right facts, events, or
people. By limiting a witness's ability to speak to the press, section 132.5
may prevent the wasting of judicial and prosecutorial resources caused by
calling impeachable witnesses, as well as minimizing one of many potential
harms to a defendant's right to a fair trial. The court in California First
Amendment Coalition, however, did not find the state's desire to avoid in-
convenience compelling. 1
With these burdens on witness speech in mind, could section 132.5 be
amended to reduce the financial burden on witnesses imposed by time con-
straints and be narrowly tailored to meet the government's compelling inter-
est? The only logical step is to amend the law as it currently stands so as to
prohibit witnesses from receiving payment for information relevant to a trial
up until such time as they have completed their testimony, rather than re-
quiring them to wait until the end of the trial. Limiting the scope of section
132.5 in such a manner, however, would not improve the financial position
of witnesses, and it would not preclude the possibility that witnesses could
be impeached. If a witness were allowed to sell her story once she was
excused from the stand, the value of her speech would be no greater than
that which is currently imposed by section 132.5. The value of her speech
would still be negated once delivered in court because the press would be
able to obtain that witness's testimony merely by observing the trial. Finally,
the witness may be recalled to the stand to testify despite having been ex-
cused once before. Consequently, limiting the scope of section 132.5 up to
the point at which the witness is excused would be vague at the very least.
The witness would have to wait until she had been permanently excused
from the trial, which might not occur until well after she had presented her
testimony. Thus, the modified statute would either not offer the protections
against witness impeachment that it currently offers by permitting witnesses
to discuss the case while still subject to recall, or it would be ineffective in
permitting the witness to maximize the possible benefits of the speech, if the
witness was not permitted to speak until after the possibility of recall had
passed.
California already had considerable mechanisms in effect to curb poten-
tial witnesses from fabricating stories prior to the enactment of sections
132.5 and 1669.7. All witnesses take an oath when they take the stand to
testify.1 2 Additionally, laws exist in California, as in other states, that pro-
hibit perjury,213 the subornation of perjury,"' and the bribery of witness-
211 California First Amendment Coalition v. Lungren, No. C 95-0440-FMS, 1995 WL
482066, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 1995).
.2 CAL. EVID. CODE § 710 (West 1995).
213 CAL. PENAL CODE § 118 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
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es." 5 In addition to these laws, the court in California First Amendment
Coalition recognized witness competency requirements" 6 and the potential
for cross-examination2"7 as being sufficient to minimize and discourage
witnesses from exaggerating or fabricating their testimony.2"'
Under section 132.5, one of the exceptions carved out for witnesses in
criminal trials includes "publisher[s], editor[s], reporter[s], writer[s], or other
person[s] connected with or employed by a newspaper, magazine.... other
publication or ... a television or radio station, for disclosing information
obtained in the ordinary course of business.""1 9 An editorial in the Sacra-
mento Bee posed a humorous challenge to the effectiveness of the statute for
those not employed by news organizations: "If you're not employed by a
news organization, . . . you can call yourself a free-lance journalist, in
which case the [statute is] meaningless . "..."220 Although perhaps con-
trived, there is a striking bit of truth to the proposition. The Supreme Court,
in refusing to address which categories of journalists qualify for constitu-
tional privileges, stated that "[f]reedom of the press is a 'fundamental per-
sonal right' which 'is not confined to newspapers and periodicals .... The
press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication
which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.'"221 Thus, any future
amendment to resurrect section 132.5 should consider this possible loophole.
There should also be some concern about the effect that section 132.5
would have on cases where the timely release of information to the media
may have a profound and positive impact on the public. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that section 132.5 had been in effect at the time of the beating of
Rodney King. The person who recorded the footage on his home video
camera of King's beating would have been left with the dilemma of releas-
ing the tape to the media without payment, solely releasing the footage for
moral reasons, or not releasing the footage at all. Had he chosen not to
release the tape, charges of police brutality might never have been made,
and the power of the police would have gone unchecked by public scrutiny.
On the other hand, the tape could have been turned over to the authorities
for use in prosecution for police brutality, yet the public may not have been
able to see the gravity of the footage and thus gone uninformed until the
trial had passed. At that point, the value of the tape to its owner would have
214 Id. § 127 (West 1988).
215 Id. § 138 (West 1988).
216 CAL. EvID. CODE § 700-704.
217 Id. § 761 (West 1966).
2' California First Amendment Coalition v. Lungren, No. C 95-0440-FMS, 1995 WL
482066, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 1995).
219 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 132.5(e)(1)-(4) (Senate), 132.5(g)(1)-(4) (Assembly).
220 The Simpson Gag-Rule Bills, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 19, 1994, at B6.
22' Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972) (quoting Lovell v. City of Griffin,
303 U.S. 444, 450, 452 (1938)).
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been less than if he had been able to release the footage in exchange for
money before the trial. In either case, the value of the video footage to the
public in the context of current events and debate would have been reduced
by its untimely release.
III. CONCLUSION
The newly enacted sections of the California Penal Code and Civil Code
seek to promote justice and the appearance of justice by further ensuring the
right of the accused to a fair trial. These statutes seek to do so by providing
extra incentives to both prevent exposure of jurors to external influences and
improper motives and to preserve the validity of witness testimony.
Under California Penal Code Section 116.5, jurors will be discouraged
further from engaging in contacts that would be prejudicial to the Sixth
Amendment rights of the defendant, the interests of justice, and the appear-
ance of justice. Furthermore, the statutes, to a limited extent, would provide
an extra limitation on, and incentive against, those individuals who might
attempt to exert some sort of influence on juries.
The statutes prevent jurors from being influenced in their role as impar-
tial arbiters of justice. By limiting undesired outside information or influ-
ence from reaching or being employed by jurors, the accused stands a better
chance of receiving a fair trial. The one weakness of this argument is that,
regardless of any delayed timing in making agreements with the press, op-
portunities for jurors to profit later from their duties may affect their attitude
about performing those duties and the role which they hope to play during
deliberations.
Once section 116.5 is properly amended to exclude the prosecution of
former jurors who make agreements after being excused prior to the con-
clusion of a trial, the section should withstand any future constitutional
challenges.
By requiring judges to inform jurors of their duty not to accept or agree
to accept payment for information concerning the trial, California Penal
Code Section 1122 should reinforce to jurors the expectations of their basic
functions, duties, and conduct. California Penal Code Section 1122.5 will
allow judges to further emphasize these expectations after each adjournment
of the court by reminding the jurors of them before submission of the cause
to the jury.
California Penal Code Section 132.5 sought to prevent witnesses from
embellishing their testimony in order to increase the monetary value of their
story before or during trial. Specifically, it aimed to prevent people from
"becoming witnesses"--i.e., fabricating stories-in high-profile cases, where
a potential monetary gain may exist in providing a story to those who would
pay for such information. Without measures aimed at preventing witness
behavior prejudicial to the defendant, the credibility of witnesses in general
may be tarnished if jurors learn during direct or cross-examination that the
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witness had already revealed his or her testimony in exchange for consider-
ation. The legislature should work toward amending the statute to overcome
its current constitutional infirmities. This would include creation of an ex-
ception for witnesses who receive a benefit, money, or other consideration
from media and non-media sources for purposes other than the generation of
financial gains and publicity. Exceptions should also be made for defendants
who offer rewards for exculpatory information and journalists who offer
anonymity in exchange for information.
There still exists the possibility that some witnesses will nevertheless
give in to media pressure and provide information about their upcoming
testimony. In this instance, the statutes provide no protection. As stated in
Sheppard, however, a trial judge has broad discretionary powers to shape
the behavior of the media and trial participants both in and out of the court-
room in order to effectuate a fair trial for the accused. If such were not the
case-that a witness was not able to escape the media-then it would be
possible that the trial judge had not performed his duties according to
Sheppard.222
There should be no encroachment on the freedom of the press in gather-
ing or publishing information regarding trials. Judges already have the
means of encouraging the media to limit their contact and coverage during
certain portions of a trial, based on the particular circumstances of notoriety,
in order to ensure a fair and orderly trial. The press may have a more diffi-
cult time gathering information from witnesses who would rather wait to
speak until they can be paid lawfully, but the interests of justice in the ap-
propriate release of information outweigh this minor inconvenience.
The statutes give the media an extra incentive to obey the wishes of the
court in regard to the obtaining of information from jurors. Judges have the
added ability to assess fines against members of the media or the public if
they attempt to solicit information from jurors in exchange for money prior
to the termination of their duties. Thus, the present section 116.5 of the
California Penal Code, as limited by the Federal District Court in Los An-
geles, and an amended section 132.5, have the potential to clearly and con-
stitutionally indicate that the rightful place of "checkbook journalism" in
criminal trials should be limited.
JAMES R. CADY
22 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 360-62 (1966).
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APPENDIX
THE SLIDING SCALE OF INFORMATION VALUE IN A TRIAL
VALUE OF INFORMATION TO SPEAKER
SPEAKER prior to trial during trial after trial
JURORS low(l) medium(2) high(3)
WITNESSES high(4) medium(5) low(6)
(1) Prior to the trial, even during voir dire, the value of jurors' speech is
minimal because they have yet to begin the process of viewing and evaluat-
ing evidence in the trial.
(2) During the trial, the value of the speech increases as the jurors experi-
ence the trial process and interact with the court. Jurors dismissed from duty
have less value placed on their information than the jurors who successfully
serve through the end of their duties. Thus, a sliding scale could be visual-
ized whereby the value of jurors' speech would increase the longer they
remain on duty.
(3) Jurors' speech would achieve its maximum value after deliberation,
delivery of the verdict, and dismissal from duty following completion of
those duties. Some might even speculate that the value of the juror's speech
would further depend on the verdict rendered.
(4) The value of witnesses' speech is at its height during the pre-trial phase
where information gathering is also at its height and the theory or strategy
for prosecution has yet to unfold. The value of the witnesses' speech would
be based on various factors including among others:
" the likelihood that the witness will be called to testify
• the credibility of the witness and her information
• the admissibility of her potential testimony at trial
* the critical nature of her potential testimony
• the notoriety of the defendant
" the notoriety of the witness
(5) The value of witnesses' speech can be diminished if they are not called
to testify or are impeached on the stand. Furthermore, if witnesses' testimo-
ny is permitted to be published by the press, then the need for the media to
pay the witnesses for the information is negated.
(6) Once the trial is over, the ability of witnesses to put a price on their
information may be severely undermined unless the size and nature of their
story is of such sensationalist value that it is nonetheless still marketable.
Thus it becomes evident that the financial burdens placed on the free
speech of jurors and witnesses are unequal. Because sections 116.5 and
132.5 prohibit accepting payment or other consideration prior to the conclu-
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sion of a trial, the burden is de minimis on jurors and heaviest on witnesses.
Jurors are prohibited from making any agreements or receiving any payment
or other consideration until ninety days after dismissal from juror duty, at
which point the value of their speech is at its peak. In contrast, witnesses
may not make agreements or receive payment or other consideration until
after the trial, at which point the value of their speech is at its lowest.
